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	<title>ICTSD &#187; Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme</title>
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	<link>http://ictsd.org</link>
	<description>International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development</description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2010 08:37:49 +0000</pubDate>
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	<language>en</language>
			<item>
		<title>Policy Implications of Recent WTO&#160;Cases</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/61616/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/61616/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Nov 2009 06:21:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>bshaffer</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement Understanding]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Dialogues]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[WTO Cases]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=61616</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), in collaboration with King and Spalding, is pleased to organize the first dialogue in its new series on the Policy Implications of Recent WTO Cases. This Informal Roundtable on WTO Jurisprudence and Sustainable Development will analyze and discuss three landmark cases (US-Cotton, Brazil-Tyres, and Colombia Ports [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), in collaboration with King and Spalding, is pleased to organize the first dialogue in its new series on the<strong> Policy Implications of Recent WTO Cases</strong>. This Informal Roundtable on WTO Jurisprudence and Sustainable Development will analyze and discuss three landmark cases (US-Cotton, Brazil-Tyres, and Colombia Ports of Entry) and their policy implications.  It will take place on November 23rd  2009 in the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) Room C2, from 9.15 hrs to 13.00 hrs, and will be followed by a buffet lunch.</p>

<p><a href="http://ictsd.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/implications-of-recent-wto-cases-agenda.pdf">Agenda</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/61616/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>DSU Reform and Beyond - Enhancing Developing Countries’ Capacity to Participate in WTO DSU&#160;Proceedings</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/57449/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/57449/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 06:43:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>mwilke</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dialogue]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Dialogues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=57449</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The dialogue will address issues regarding the accessibility of the multilateral trading system for developing countries, specifically, enhancing the ability of these countries to effectively utilize the dispute settlement system in light of capacity constraints, the structure of the DSU itself and developments affecting the international trading system.
The ability of countries to advance or protect their trade [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The dialogue will address issues regarding the accessibility of the multilateral trading system for developing countries, specifically, enhancing the ability of these countries to effectively utilize the dispute settlement system in light of capacity constraints, the structure of the DSU itself and developments affecting the international trading system.</p>
<p>The ability of countries to advance or protect their trade interests, particularly those which significantly promote their sustainable development objectives, through a rule-based, legally binding and commercially meaningful dispute settlement system is critical to the stability and success of any international trading arrangement.</p>
<p>With more rigorous disciplines and a growing body of jurisprudence, the WTO dispute settlement system has however become significantly more legalistic and consequently more arduous to navigate. WTO Member countries which are keen to avail of the system to protect or advance their trade rights and objectives face the daunting challenge of grasping and keeping pace with its increased complexity. Though developing countries&#8217; participation in trade disputes has increased considerably, their engagement remains limited.</p>
<p>While DSU reform remains an outstanding issue given the continuing absence of negotiating outcomes under the Doha Round, developments outside the WTO have brought even greater focus to the importance of effective and accessible dispute settlement mechanisms.</p>
<p>From the increasingly fragmented international trading system, to the economic crisis which spurred the recent surge in protectionist measures, on to the trade-related measures being debated as a means to achieve objectives in other international fora (such as on climate change), the DSU seems ‘fit to be tested&#8217;. Many of the issues raised in this context affect developing countries and development concerns disproportionately.</p>
<p>By providing space for various stakeholders to discuss different legal and extra-legal mechanisms and approaches deemed particularly relevant for the successful use of the dispute settlement system, ICTSD hopes to enable a range of different actors to integrate sound practices and solutions in advancing or protecting their trade interests through dispute settlement.</p>
<p><a href="http://ictsd.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/agenda-ictsd-event-on-dispute-settlement-nov-3-4.doc">Draft Agenda</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Global Networking to Increase Member-State&#160;Capacity</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/55907/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/55907/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 13:39:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>bshaffer</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dialogue]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement Understanding]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Dialogues]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Participates]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=55907</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the Centre for Democratic Network Governance of Roskilde University are pleased to organize a dialogue on WTO Dispute Settlement, entitled “Global Networking to Increase Member-State Capacity&#8221;.  The dialogue will take place on September 29th 2009, from 9:00 - 11:00 at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), [...]]]></description>
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<p>The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the Centre for Democratic Network Governance of Roskilde University are pleased to organize a dialogue on WTO Dispute Settlement, entitled <strong>“Global Networking to Increase Member-State Capacity&#8221;</strong>.  The dialogue will take place on September 29th 2009, from 9:00 - 11:00 at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Room D.</p>
<p><strong>Background:</strong></p>
<p>Whilst the DSU is intergovernmental in nature, WTO Dispute Settlement would not be possible without the involvement of a wider network of stakeholders. Private firms, legal counsel, and non-governmental organizations all provide invaluable assistance to Member-states hoping to overcome disagreement. This panel will address the role of non-state actors in WTO disputes and how they might be further used to increase the capacity of Member-states to engage in the process.</p>
<p><strong>Speakers:</strong></p>
<p>· Professor Gregory Shaffer (University of Minnesota Law School)<br />
· Mr Brendan McGivern (Executive Partner of the Geneva office of Whyte &amp; Case LLP)<br />
· H.E. Mr Virachai Plasai (Thai Ambassador to the Hague, formerly director-general of the Department of International Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand)<br />
· Mr Johannes Bernabe (Senior Associate, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development</p>
<p><strong>Chair: </strong></p>
<p>Dr Michael Strange (Centre for Democratic Network Governance, Roskilde University)</p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Burden of Proof in WTO Dispute Settlement: Contemplating Preponderance of the&#160;Evidence</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/45313/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/45313/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2009 14:14:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=45313</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the agreement that governs the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, seeks to ensure an improved prospect of compliance, given its provisions on compensation and retaliation and thus constitutes a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trade system.
Now in its second decade, member states have demonstrated that the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the agreement that governs the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, seeks to ensure an improved prospect of compliance, given its provisions on compensation and retaliation and thus constitutes a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trade system.</p>
<p>Now in its second decade, member states have demonstrated that the structure and enforcement mechanisms provided by the DSU provide a legal recourse unparalleled by many similar intergovernmental bodies. Yet growing use has revealed problems within the institutional framework of the system itself, as well as in the jurisprudence thus far developed.</p>
<p>These shortcomings threaten the continued usefulness of the dispute settlement body, and by implication, the very legitimacy of the multilateral trading system itself. Truly, without effective adjudication under the DSU, a major advantage of multilateral trade coordination is lost as members will invariably seek unilateral recourse in trade disputes.</p>
<p>The burden of proof as currently applied is one such point of concern.</p>
<p>A legal principle not defined by the DSU, its meaning only emerges through amalgamation of Appellate Body decisions. Oft repeated yet inescapably uncertain, the rule has emerged that parties must forward sufficient evidence to make a ‘<em>prima facie</em>&#8216; case.</p>
<p>Illusive in both definition and application, this principle can create profound challenges to system participation and overall function. Appellate Body reasoning has been applied capriciously at the panel level, undermining predictability. Contradictions between rulings undermine consistency, and overall system transparency is eroded as how much and what kind of evidence is required to satisfy the burden is unknown, allowing decision makers to seemingly draw arbitrary distinctions amongst evidentiary submissions.</p>
<p>Since the adjudication of trade disputes would remain ambiguous without the transparent and consistent application of the burden of proof, the lack of clarity within the ‘<em>prima facie</em>&#8216; principle could be seen to detract from overall system legitimacy while further presenting an additional obstacle to entry for inexperienced members, especially the developing and least developed amongst them, wishing to engage in the dispute settlement system.</p>
<p>This study clarifies the standard through reference to WTO jurisprudence, scholarly analysis, as well as international and domestic legal traditions. Providing both general overview and focused guidance, this paper tracks case-by-case interpretations of the standard at all levels of WTO dispute settlement, providing key language while attempting to reconcile internal contradictions.</p>
<p>After comprehensive analysis, this study advocates modifying the burden of proof to a preponderance of the evidence standard, a principle which the authors argue is better suited to the inherent structural organization of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism.</p>
<p>It is the central conclusion of this paper that such an adoption would provide clarity within the system while easing the entry of new participants to the system - both ultimate goals of the DSU. Providing useful commentary on how this new standard may be implemented, this study cites evidence from recent decisions indicating that a shift to this standard may already be underway within the dispute settlement system.</p>
<p>This study aims to assist both experienced practitioners and newcomers in understanding the current nuances of the dispute settlement system, while also presenting a well-reasoned argument for reform. It is our hope that you find this paper a useful contribution within the field.</p>
<p>This paper is produced under ICTSD&#8217;s research and dialogue program on Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of International Trade which aims to explore realistic strategies to maximize developing countries&#8217; capability to engage international dispute settlement systems to defend their trade interest and sustainable development objectives. The authors are James Headen Pfitzer, legal technical officer at the World Health Organization in Geneva, and Sheila Sabune, Trade in Services and Dispute Settlement Programme Officer at ICTSD.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Addressing Issues of Legal Capacity and Compelling Compliance under the WTO Dispute Settlement&#160;Understanding</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/45131/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/45131/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2009 09:59:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement Understanding]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Dialogues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=45131</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The objective of the roundtable is to initiate discussion regarding the accessibility of the multilateral trading system for developing nations, specifically, the ability of these emerging nations to effectively utilize the dispute settlement system in light of legal capacity and the structure of the DSU itself.
Two studies commissioned by ICTSD and completed with the assistance [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The objective of the roundtable is to initiate discussion regarding the accessibility of the multilateral trading system for developing nations, specifically, the ability of these emerging nations to effectively utilize the dispute settlement system in light of legal capacity and the structure of the DSU itself.</p>
<p>Two studies commissioned by ICTSD and completed with the assistance of the Geneva International Academic Network will be presented and discussed.</p>
<p>Andrea Bianchi and Lorenzo Gradoni will present the findings of their study<strong> ‘Developing Countries, Countermeasures and WTO law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International Law.&#8217;</strong></p>
<p>Additionally, authors Marc L. Busch, Eric Reinhardt and Gregory Shaffer will contribute to the discussions by presenting their study titled <strong>‘Does Legal Capacity Matter? Explaining Dispute Initiation and Anti-Dumping Actions in the WTO.&#8217;  </strong></p>
<p>BACKGROUND</p>
<p>It is estimated that use of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism by developing nations increased by 40% in the year 2008. In light of this general trend, observers have noted that as the multilateral trading system continues to be increasingly utilized, the extent to which emerging nations can engage as active participants will help determine the ongoing legitimacy of the WTO system and its applicability for all nations.</p>
<p>Undoubtedly, one of the most frequently identified complaints with the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism is difficulty in compelling Members to comply with adverse DSU rulings. This barrier is often felt most strongly by the developing world, which continues to cite the ineffectiveness of countermeasures in ensuring compliance as a major hurdle to effective recourse under the multilateral system. For a number of reasons ranging from trade value to dependence on foreign aid, developing nations are often unable or unwilling to meaningfully realize their rights under the WTO dispute settlement system, calling into question the overall usefulness of the system.</p>
<p>Even more basic, however, are the conditions leading to dispute initiation.  Until now, there has been virtually no in depth analysis regarding the correlation between a nation&#8217;s legal capacity and their susceptibility to WTO violative practices. As direct evidence has emerged demonstrating that legal capacity plays a critical role in dispute initiation and anti-dumping protection, discussion of these issues is essential to providing benefit for all WTO Members. </p>
<p>These studies present innovative responses aimed to assist developing nations attempting to participate within the WTO framework through systematic analysis of the issues of compelling compliance and legal capacity - two issues with which developing countries are inescapably connected. It is our hope that presentation of these studies will initiate discussion and thought on these issues, both as a foundation for future reform and as a resource for those confronting present realities.</p>
<p>The interventions by key experts will be followed by a discussion with participants - see programme below.</p>
<p>Given that there is limited seating, we would highly appreciate if you could kindly confirm your intention to participate by email to Sheila Sabune (<span class="mh-hyperlinked"><a href='http://mailhide.recaptcha.net/d?k=01OGL-f_uxGvkAe6519tu-HA==&c=ikqSCx3j9AW-HW0MYkThlfCoXO46uM-uoRXpCjUMv2g=' onclick="window.open('http://mailhide.recaptcha.net/d?k=01OGL-f_uxGvkAe6519tu-HA==&amp;c=ikqSCx3j9AW-HW0MYkThlfCoXO46uM-uoRXpCjUMv2g=', '', 'toolbar=0,scrollbars=0,location=0,statusbar=0,menubar=0,resizable=0,width=500,height=300'); return false;">ssabune@ictsd.ch</a></span>) or William Kraus (<span class="mh-hyperlinked"><a href='http://mailhide.recaptcha.net/d?k=01OGL-f_uxGvkAe6519tu-HA==&c=KeDYosF6Li8jHLssQ9KgrA==' onclick="window.open('http://mailhide.recaptcha.net/d?k=01OGL-f_uxGvkAe6519tu-HA==&amp;c=KeDYosF6Li8jHLssQ9KgrA==', '', 'toolbar=0,scrollbars=0,location=0,statusbar=0,menubar=0,resizable=0,width=500,height=300'); return false;">wkraus@ictsd.ch</a></span>)  or by fax (at 41 22 917 80 93).</p>
<p>We hope you will find the presentations lively and contribute with your experience and expertise during the open discussion that ensues.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Suspension of Concessions in the Services Sector: Legal, Technical and Economic&#160;Problems</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/45081/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/45081/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2009 09:39:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=45081</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The creation of the WTO dispute settlement system has been called a major achievement by observers and its importance has been echoed from all sides of the multilateral trading system. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the agreement that governs the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, seeks to ensure an improved prospect of compliance, given its provisions [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The creation of the WTO dispute settlement system has been called a major achievement by observers and its importance has been echoed from all sides of the multilateral trading system. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the agreement that governs the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, seeks to ensure an improved prospect of compliance, given its provisions on compensation and retaliation and thus constitutes a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trade system.<br />
 <br />
Now in its second decade, the mechanisms and jurisprudence of the World Trade Organization continue to develop as Members gain experience applying the various provisions of the DSU. Although formal provisions exist whereby members may attempt to compel compliance of offending countries, many observers repeatedly identify implementation and enforcement as a continued source of frustration. Of those, one of the most equivocal methods of compelling compliance is the suspension of concessions.<br />
 <br />
With relatively few arbitral decisions and a notable lack of definitional guidance, member states attempting suspension have been forced to proceed with uncertainty in a continually evolving body of law. Concepts such as equivalence in retaliatory suspensions are not defined by the DSU, while standards of review and evidentiary weight have only been developed through the literal trial and error of members.<br />
 <br />
Presenting concise legal analysis as well as general overview, this study will assist both experienced practitioners and newcomers with the process of suspension of concessions in the services sector, with particular focus on GATS concessions. This publication provides clear guidance through doctrinal scrutiny and reference to the most recent jurisprudence, with particular reference on the instructive decisions of EC-Bananas (III) and US-Gambling.<br />
 <br />
This study additionally provides useful discussion on the mechanics of suspending concessions, describing in clear language the exact structure and procedures characterizing the body of law, with particular examination of suspension of specific commitments across the different modes of supply. Furthermore, the study explores the legal, technical and economic problems of retaliatory and cross retaliatory actions, presenting both practical guidance and strategic considerations for those wishing to employ this method of inducing compliance.<br />
 <br />
Of particular importance is the insight this publication provides to developing nations.<br />
 <br />
Historically, problems of compliance have often been most poignantly experienced by these countries, which often lack trade leverage over developed nations, and there is a sense among many that formal provisions for inducing DSU compliance continue these systemic inequities.<br />
 <br />
This study examines the potential reasons developing nations avoid compelling compliance, while offering considerations for those nations wishing to enforce suspension of concessions against the largest trading nations. Noting that in most situations, retaliation is likely to hurt complaining parties, this study identifies the cross-retaliatory suspensions most likely to compel enforcement among developed nations. Arguing that high profile and politically influential service sectors are most vulnerable to trade pressure, this study identifies the potential utility of suspending concessions against the financial service sector through taxation measures.<br />
 <br />
However, this study extends a message of caution to developing nations attempting to suspend concessions, concluding that in most cases cross-retaliation in services is unlikely to be successful and can be detrimental to the complaining party - particularly to those from developing countries.<br />
 <br />
This paper is produced under ICTSD&#8217;s research and dialogue program on Dispute Settlement and Legal Aspects of International Trade which aims to explore realistic strategies to maximize developing countries&#8217; capability to engage international dispute settlement systems to defend their trade interest and sustainable development objectives. The author is Dr. Arthur E. Appleton, a partner at Appleton Luff law firm.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Trading Profiles and Developing Country Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement&#160;System</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/36681/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/36681/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2008 11:22:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Series]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Issue paper]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=36681</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Why a specific group of countries dominates WTO disputes has been one recurrent question by many observers.  Reasons for such an imbalance can be found in the difference in trade composition, volume of trade, income levels, aid levels, and legal capacity between active and inactive members. In order to favor the participation of weaker partners [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why a specific group of countries dominates WTO disputes has been one recurrent question by many observers.  Reasons for such an imbalance can be found in the difference in trade composition, volume of trade, income levels, aid levels, and legal capacity between active and inactive members. In order to favor the participation of weaker partners in the DSU system, the paper introduces two interesting potential scenarios, using an economic model, in which LDCs would take collective action to overcome this problem.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Does Legal Capacity Matter? Explaining Dispute Initiation and Anti-dumping Actions in the&#160;WTO</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/41456/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/41456/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2008 11:10:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Series]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=41456</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[At present, there is virtually no systematic assessment of the issues of legal capacity and there is limited empirical evidence about how it affects patterns of trade disputes and import protection. This paper explores how in the case of antidumping, the level of legal capacity affects patters of dispute initiation and underlying anti-dumping protection among [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At present, there is virtually no systematic assessment of the issues of legal capacity and there is limited empirical evidence about how it affects patterns of trade disputes and import protection. This paper explores how in the case of antidumping, the level of legal capacity affects patters of dispute initiation and underlying anti-dumping protection among WTO members.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Developing Countries, Countermeasures and WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International&#160;Law</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/41424/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/41424/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2008 10:30:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Series]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=41424</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Developing countries relying on the DSU are particularly troubled by the ineffectiveness of countermeasures as a means to ensure compliance by major trading partners. The difference in trade value often proves suspension of concessions to be detrimental to the retaliating developing country’s domestic market leaving countermeasures not only ineffective but even counterproductive. This paper aims [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Developing countries relying on the DSU are particularly troubled by the ineffectiveness of countermeasures as a means to ensure compliance by major trading partners. The difference in trade value often proves suspension of concessions to be detrimental to the retaliating developing country’s domestic market leaving countermeasures not only ineffective but even counterproductive. This paper aims to explore realistic strategies to maximize developing countries’ capability in engaging the WTO dispute settlement system to defend their trade interests and sustainable development objectives.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<item>
		<title>Cross-Retaliation in TRIPS and GATS: Options for Developing&#160;Countries</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/30531/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/30531/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2008 09:51:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Dialogues]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[ 
 
 
ICTSD Roundtable
9h30-12h00
Friday, 17th October 2008 
World Meteorological Organisation
Room C1 
*Avenue de la Paix 7 bis, 1202 Geneva 
The objective of the roundtable was to examine options and challenges in the use of cross-retaliation in TRIPS and GATS with a view to enable developing countries to make effective use of it under the WTO Dispute Settlement system.
 
Professor Frederick [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2> <a href="http://ictsd.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/roundtable2_1.gif"><img class="size-medium wp-image-30532 aligncenter" title="Roundtable" src="http://ictsd.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/roundtable2_1-300x150.gif" alt="" width="336" height="229" /></a><br />
 <br />
<a name="OLE_LINK2"></a> <br />
ICTSD Roundtable<br />
9h30-12h00<br />
Friday, 17th October 2008 </h2>
<h2>World Meteorological Organisation</h2>
<p><strong>Room C1 </strong></p>
<p><strong>*Avenue de la Paix 7 bis, 1202 Geneva </strong></p>
<p>The objective of the roundtable was to examine options and challenges in the use of cross-retaliation in TRIPS and GATS with a view to enable developing countries to make effective use of it under the WTO Dispute Settlement system.<br />
 <br />
Professor Frederick M. Abbott and Dr. Arthur E. Appleton presented the findings of two studies, commissioned by ICTSD, in which they respectively investigate the legal, technical and economic problems raised in the use of cross-retaliation under TRIPS and GATS, and present possible solutions to these problems.<br />
 <br />
<em style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Background </em><br />
Cross-retaliation refers to the suspension of concessions in a sector of trade different than the sector in which the trade injury is suffered, including under a different WTO agreement. The incorporation of the “new area” agreements of TRIPS and GATS, as a consequence of the Uruguay Round negotiations, introduced a more complex era in dispute settlement and retaliation. For many developing countries, suspension of concessions in TRIPS or GATS may represent a valuable alternative option when it is not practical or effective for them to rely on standard retaliation. This is often the case due to the unbalanced nature of trading relations and the asymmetry in economic power.<br />
 <br />
However, this option has rarely been used by developing countries. Thus, the complex legal and technical problems, as well as the economic consequences, of resorting to cross-retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement and the GATS need to be examined comprehensively, in order for developing countries to make effective use of this option.<br />
 <br />
Professor Abbott has investigated cross-retaliation under the TRIPS Agreement. He presents the range of legal options available to governments considering the suspension of concessions under the TRIPS Agreement particularly in terms of identifying the level of suspension and avoiding legal conflicts.<br />
Dr. Appleton has identified and outlined options on how to implement cross- retaliation within the GATS. In this connection, he has examined Modes and sectors of service supply where cross retaliation would be legally and technically feasible while creating an incentive for the violating member to comply without causing harm to the economy of the retaliating member.<br />
 <br />
After the presentations, comments were made by a number of distinguished experts and delegates. An open discussion with the audience followed. (Programme attached). The two studies by Professor Abbott and Dr.  Appleton were made available at the meeting.</p>
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