A new study shows that Doha market access promises to least-developed countries (LDCs) would be undermined by barriers to key exports. This groundbreaking report was released in advance of the Mini-Ministerial trade talks held at the WTO headquarters in Geneva during the last two weeks in July.

As trade ministers gathered at the WTO to try and reach a compromise in the global trade talks, one of the main objectives was to help the world’s poorest countries expand their participation in global trade through the successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round. But, promises by industrialised nations to grant unrestricted market access to exports from LDCs as part of a WTO deal would be rendered practically worthless unless they cover all products, according to this new study commissioned by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. In this paper, it is estimated how LDCs’ access to rich and selected emerging markets would be affected by excluding certain products from liberalisation.

WTO members agreed in 2005 to make it mandatory for developed countries, and optional for developing countries, to give duty- and quota-free market access to all exports from least-developed countries (LDCs). They insisted on being allowed to exclude up to 3% of tariff lines from this so-called ‘Duty Free Quota Free Market Access’ (DFQFMA) initiative, in order to protect sensitive sectors.

This recent study shows that this exception could suffice to cover the small handful of products that LDCs make and export competitively. “In most developed country markets, 3% of tariff lines cover between 90% and 98% of exports from LDCs,” found author David Laborde. “The 3 % exclusion manages to neutralize the initiative almost completely in developed country markets,” he wrote.

Extending duty- and quota-free coverage to all products, however, would minimise the harm caused to LDCs by multilateral tariff cuts under a Doha agreement, the study found. When rich countries lower import barriers to products from China, India, Brazil, and the industrialised world, it inevitably erodes the trade preferences that LDCs enjoy in their markets. But with full duty and quota-free market access for LDCs, these losses are confined to a much smaller number of countries.

The study demonstrates that giving LDCs duty-free market access and simple rules of origin leads to export growth and diversification. As the Director of Programmes at ICTSD, Christophe Bellman, said, “Quite simply, duty-free quota-free access for LDCs works.”

The G-33 is the main proponent of the need to exempt special products from tariff cuts. It maintains that the delivery of this flexibility for developing countries is an essential step in ensuring that the outcome of the agricultural negotiations is faithful to the mandate of the Doha Development Agenda. On the other hand, countries such as the US, Malaysia and Thailand argue that special products should not be exempted from tariff reductions because all Members are expected to have market access commitments, as a contribution to the Doha Round. These countries propose that flexibilities for special products be limited to smaller tariff cuts and lesser tariff rate quota (TRQ) expansion compared to non-special products.

To assess developing countries’ need for market access flexibility, this paper looks into the difference between applied and bound duties, or the tariff overhang, for 16 proxy special products which are the most commonly identified potential special products from the 19 country studies on SP and Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) conducted by ICTSD. These products are: rice, corn, wheat, beans, milk, dairy products, bovine meat, goat meat, sheep meat, pork, chicken, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, vegetable oils and sugar (ICTSD 2007).

This paper focuses on commodities that have either a zero or a very minimal gap between applied and bound rates for each country. These have the most need for maximum market access flexibility, as any tariff reduction for these products will result in effective cuts on both bound and applied duties, as well as the narrowing down of the difference between bound and applied tariffs for commodities that are important to developing countries’ food security, livelihood security and rural development objectives.

The paper examines the tariff structures for special products of 30 developing country Members of G-33, excluding least-developed countries (LDCs).1 An analysis of current tariff bindings and applied rates shows that nine have zero or negative overhangs, which means that any tariff cut on the bound rates of special products will result in a further narrowing down of the already limited difference between bound applied tariffs. These countries – Barbados, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica Nicaragua, the Philippines and Venezuela – need to exempt some of their products from tariff reductions. The most common products that have zero or negative tariff overhangs across these countries are rice, chicken, corn and onions.2 Seventeen of the 30 countries covered by the study have tariff overhangs below 10 percentage points, while twenty have tariff overhangs below 20 percentage points.

In approximating the number of special products that should be exempted from tariff reductions, one logical option is to identify countries and commodities that have no or minimal tariff overhangs (not exceeding 10 percentage points) as these will have effective tariff cuts once the proposed tariff reduction for special products is implemented. Based on this criterion, the percentage of SPs that should be excluded from tariff cuts varies widely with each country from 6.25 percent of total SPs in the cases of Grenada and Guyana, to as much as 100 percent in the cases of China and Cote d’Ivoire. Taking all country data together, the percentage of special products that needs maximum flexibility ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 100 percent, at an average of 23.85 percent. Expanding the minimum tariff overhang to 20 percentage points will slightly increase this average to 26.34 percent. There is great disparity in the distribution of overhangs that the above averages fail to capture.

These figures can be viewed as a minimum approximation of developing countries’ need to exempt SPs from tariff reductions, because the analysis is based on the use of the 16 proxy special products across G-33 countries. However, each country has its own SP list, which will more accurately reflect its need for market access flexibility. To have a more realistic evaluation of a country’s need for tariff cut exemption, this paper cross-referenced the results of the analysis above with information from the ICTSD country studies on SP and SSM.3 Data show that some countries’ need for maximum market access flexibility is indeed actually greater, and this becomes more apparent as the SP list becomes more accurate. For instance, for Honduras, the analysis based on the use of the 16 proxy special products showed that 12.5 percent of products need to be exempted from tariff reductions; however, once the analysis is done using the more specific SP list from the Honduras country study commissioned by ICTSD, this number increases to 57 percent, indicating that more than half of the country’s special products have minimal tariff overhang and as such can benefit greatly from a zero cut treatment. The same is true in the case of Barbados and the Philippines where the number of SPs that need to be exempted from tariff reductions increases significantly from 18 percent to 73.33 percent and from 31.25 percent to 81 percent respectively once the lists of special products from the individual ICTSD country studies are used in the evaluation.

However, countries that generally have high tariff bindings and relatively lower applied import duties yielded the same results when analysed using the 16 proxy special products as well as the ICTSD SP list. Overall, the percentage of special products that need to be exempted from tariff cuts, on account of limited difference between bound and applied tariffs, increased from 23.85 percent to 34.90 percent. In terms of tariff lines, the percentage of special products requiring market access flexibility ranges from zero to 11 percent of total 6 digit HS (harmonised system) tariff lines, based on data from countries that identified their special products at this level. However, the wide difference in the tariff structures of developing countries makes these figures less meaningful.

In terms of products, those most commonly identified as having minimal tariff overhangs across all 16 ICTSD studies are beef or bovine meat, pork, milk, dairy products, potatoes, poultry meat and sugar. Other possible potential SPs that have no or narrow gaps between bound and applied rates are: cabbages, carrots, onions, rice, sheep meat, beans, peas, coffee, garlic, lettuce and maize, among others.

Across the 16 ICTSD country studies, there are 45 instances when potential special products have negative, zero or minimal tariff overhangs. This indicates that many developing countries may negotiate for maximum flexibility in the treatment of products that are important to their food security, livelihood security and rural development objectives.

The paper also simulated the application of the proposed treatment for special products on commodities from the country specific SP listing from the 16 ICTSD country studies. The draft modalities on agriculture issued in May 2008 by Agriculture Committee Chairman Falconer outlined the possible treatment of special products. Paragraph 123 of the said document lays out the possible ranges, as described below:

There shall be [a maximum entitlement of 20 per cent and a minimum entitlement4 of] 8 per cent5 of tariff lines available for self-designation as Special Products. Within this entitlement, [forty per cent of those6] [no] tariff lines shall be eligible for no cut. For the remaining tariff lines, there shall be an overall average cut of 15 per cent achieved with a minimum cut of 12 per cent and a maximum cut of 20 per cent on each tariff line.

Guided by these draft modalities, this paper generated new bound rates, and overhangs of 8 percent, 12 percent, 15 percent, based on the proposed tariff cuts for SPs. In order to more accurately evaluate the implications of the proposed treatment on special products for developing countries, the paper used the more specific SP listing from the 16 country studies in determining the percentage of potential special products that would have minimal tariff overhangs every time import duties are reduced.

The results of the simulations show that for some countries, the difference between bound and applied tariffs decreases as tariff cuts increase. For instance, once tariffs on special products are reduced by 8 percent, the number of SPs with tariff overhangs not exceeding 10 percent increases for Barbados and Ecuador but remains unchanged for the other countries. A 15 percent tariff cut on special products will increase the percentage of SPs with minimal tariff overhangs for the Philippines, from 81.81 percent to 90 percent, in addition to the two countries mentioned earlier.

Similarly, more commodities stand to lose the difference between bound and applied tariffs across the 16 countries as tariffs on special products are reduced. In particular, more countries register minimal tariff overhang for milk, pork, poultry meat, sugar, coconut, tomatoes, groundnut and vegetable oil, as import duties on these commodities are cut, based on the proposed modalities on the treatment of SPs.

However, the difference between bound and applied tariff rates only provides one dimension in assessing developing countries’ need for maximum market access flexibility. Another assessment dimension is the capability of current tariff bindings to cover the gap between the domestic price and import price of special products. This is an important consideration because for tariffs to be effective policy tools they should afford governments the flexibility to protect producers from displacement by giving the state the capacity and option to equalise domestic prices with import prices through tariff bindings.

As can be expected, countries with low tariff bindings are more likely to have inadequate bound duties, and as such less capacity to address price gaps for special products to help them protect their small agricultural producers from importation. Examples of these countries are China, Fiji, Ecuador and the Philippines. Fiji and the Philippines have fairly linear tariff structures, with import duty bindings pegged mostly at 40 percent. On the other hand, China and Ecuador have more divergent tariff profiles as bound tariffs vary from one special product to another. For Ecuador, for instance, tariff bindings on special products range from 20 percent to 70 percent, while for China bound rates vary, from 3 percent to 65 percent. Still, what these countries have in common is the fact that in many instances, their tariff bindings are not sufficient to bridge the gap between domestic and import prices for their potential special products. For these countries, any tariff cut on special products will further whittle away their capability and option to bridge the gap in domestic and import price, and consequently their means to protect their small farmers and agricultural producers from liberalisation.

The treatment and selection of special products is a sensitive subject because of the divergent conditions and needs of developing countries. Some countries have negligible tariff bindings while others have high tariff bindings. The results of this study demonstrate that countries with high tariff bindings may rely too heavily on a few commodities to achieve their food security, livelihood and rural development objectives while others with low tariff bindings may face broad economic consequences that impact those objectives. The case studies conducted highlight the need for some countries to be able to exempt certain products from any cuts. An effective special product designation is an important negotiating objective for many developing countries and this may be contingent upon exemption from cuts for some products.

This study attempts to assess the extent to which the proposals contained in the latest draft text would affect countries’ ability to access the SSM, and the extent to which it would be effective in bridging the gap between domestic and international prices. For this purpose, a simulation model was developed utilizing monthly data on imports of 27 agricultural commodities in six developing countries from 2000 to 2005. These monthly data were used as proxies for individual shipments.

In order to determine the extent to which countries would have access to the SSM, the study calculated the percentage of months during which the volume or price-based SSM would allow additional safeguard duties to be applied, based on varying levels of thresholds and other conditions. To measure the effectiveness of the SSM, the study first calculated the number of “problematic months” – those during which import prices plus bound tariffs fell below domestic prices by more than ten percent. The effectiveness rate was considered to be the percentage of problematic months in which additional safeguard duties could be applied and could prop up import prices beyond this ten percent threshold.

The study first analysed a ‘baseline scenario’, which adopted a number of the provisions of the SSM draft text, such as the lower settings for ‘thresholds’ and higher ones for the additional safeguard duties (or ‘remedies’) that countries would be allowed to impose. In this scenario, the SSM was accessible in an average of about 4½ out of every twelve months, but was effective in only one out of every four “problematic” months. Adjusting thresholds and remedies to mid-range levels did not have major effects on access and effectiveness rates, indicating some room for compromise on these aspects. Changes in thresholds however tended to have more discernible effects on the quality of the SSM than alterations in remedy levels. Notably, effectiveness rates did not exceed 46 percent of “problematic” months in any scenario, pointing to the limited utility of the measure even under the most ideal parameter settings.

Imposing caps based on Doha Round starting bound tariffs, current Uruguay Round bindings or applied tariffs clearly had a more debilitating effect, with access rates effectively cut in half, and the effectiveness rate plunging from the baseline level of 27 percent to only 2 percent of “problematic” months. Countries with relatively low tariffs were particularly vulnerable to such caps, which effectively limited remedial duties to the extent of tariff cuts per year in absolute percentage terms. Further simulations indicate that caps in the form of percentages of bound tariffs or absolute percentage points may yield less controversial results, although the actual effect will depend on the tariff profile of a country.

The proposed option allowing for foreign currency exchange adjustments in case of abnormal depreciation of the local currency did not significantly influence access or effectiveness rates. The 12-month maximum imposition period for the volume-based safeguard, coupled with the chair’s proposal for applying the price-based safeguard on a shipment-by-shipment basis, appeared to be superior to a 6-month or end-of-year alternative imposition period, although not by an overly significant degree. The ‘cross-check’ requirement, which disallows the use of the price-based safeguard if imports are declining, had a perceptible impact on access rates but affected the effectiveness of the SSM less significantly.

Given the fact that safeguard duties cannot be imposed on imports falling within tariff rate quota (TRQ) commitments, access and effectiveness rates may be enhanced if TRQs created in the Uruguay Round are not carried over to the Doha Round. This will however require, at the very least, a lowering of bound tariffs to in-quota levels and verification as to whether such a unilateral move is compliant with WTO rules. Finally, reclassifying special or regular products as ‘sensitive’ had detectable effects on the performance of the SSM, mainly due to the creation of new TRQ commitments, but access and effectiveness rates did not vary much with changes in the degree of deviation from the normal tiered tariff reduction formula.

很多与获得或者行使知识产权有关的法规，例如关于药品或者农用化学品上市许可的法规，都对市场准入和竞争有着直接的关系。这些法规和一个国家的“竞争政策”结合起来。鉴于发展中国家关于知识产权—竞争法的立法不到位、执行力差或者政策的缺失，一种竞争政策的进路将对确保以支持竞争的方式来行使知识产权有着非常重要的意义。

因为没有国际规则存在，发展中国家可以遵循自己的竞争法和知识产权制度。（唯一的例外是《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》（TRIPS）第40 条，该条款对各国制裁与知识产权有关的反竞争行为做出了一定的限制。）由于没有统一的国际规则，各国可以对构成不正当竞争效果的知识产权独占性有着不同的理解。

尽管通常只是适用于商品市场，竞争法事实上也可以适用于那些区别于商品和服务的技术市场。竞争法尤其可以适用于那些用知识产权来制定额外高的价格或阻止其他竞争者获取相关技术的情形。在特定领域中，竞争为新技术的开发提供了一种有力的激励。在知识产权被授权的前提下，政府还是可以采用各种手段来减轻技术垄断，促进竞争。因此，尽管TRIPS 协议第31 条b 款只是把拒绝发放自愿许可作为强制许可的先决条件，权利所有人单方拒绝许可专利（亦被称为拒绝交易）也可被考虑作为发放强制许可的条件，事实上也有很多国家正在考虑将其纳入专利法之中。

在“必要设施原则”下，一些国家的竞争法也在考虑在拒绝交易的情形下允许第三方来使用专利的可能性。这一原则可以适用于以下这种情形：一家控制着某“必要设施”的公司，拒绝第二家企业合理的关于获得该产品或服务的请求（而这第二家必须获得该产品或服务从而与第一家公司展开竞争）。尽管一些美国法院的判决中建议，信息可能构成一种“必要设施”，但总的来说该原则在知识产权领域的适用还不是非常明确。根据欧共体法律，一个所谓的“必要设施”可以包括某种知识产权。在某一知识产权对于竞争非常必要的情况下，例如，拒绝交易将阻止一种新产品的出现或者允许知识产权持有人对次级市场形成垄断，该知识产权的持有人无权拒绝其竞争者使用其权利。对于发展中国家来说，从发达国家对“拒绝交易”概念和“必要设施原则”的适用中可以获得很多有趣的经验。但是，目前世界上对此并没有一个严格的模型，因此发展中国家可以采取自己的方法来保护其公共利益。

发达国家其实普遍接受这样一种观点：拥有知识产权并不必然等同于市场上的实质支配地位。竞争法下对知识产权的尊重是建立在该知识产权是正当取得的基础之上。一旦该知识产权并非正当取得或者不应被授予，例如申请人欺骗了专利局，那么竞争法就可以被适用。除此以外，在可专利性问题上的低标准以及专利审查制度的缺陷，都可能导致低质量专利的出现，从而对竞争构成威胁。即使是在那些知识产权法与竞争法看起来基本协调的司法管辖区域内，如果某专利只有细微的技术进步或者拥有过度的权利请求，那么该专利就有可能被竞争法所干预。

以“一揽子专利”的形式累积起来的专利也可能造成反竞争的效果，例如通过合法的专利请求或者非法的专利来不当地扩展其市场实力，或者强迫一方在无选择的情况下许可其专利。“专利丛林”问题也会引起竞争法的注意——竞争者之间各种形式的合作（包括交叉许可）有可能形成所谓的专利丛林，最终限制竞争 。在竞争法下，“虚假请求”也可以同样形成诉讼主张，例如，美国联邦贸易委员会已经干预了多个靠欺诈获得的专利。

尽管许多关于知识产权和竞争法关系的文献把注意力集中在专利上，反竞争的行为也依然可能基于其他知识产权的形式。因此，一些著名的竞争法案例中也涉及了版权问题。很多研究表明，版权创造了垄断力，绝大多数信息产品市场都遵循着一条在国内和国际层面上集中的路线。对软件，尤其是对接口软件的版权保护所造成的反竞争效果，在一些案子中处在中心地位（特别是对主要软件供应商微软公司）。竞争法也经常关心对与版权收费组织有关的事情。此外，在一些案例中也探讨了商标权和竞争法两者目的之间根本性的紧张关系。

知识产权的不适当执行也可以构成一种反竞争的行为。例如，可以有效地通过初步禁令来阻止合法的竞争。这也是为什么美国和欧洲的法院在专利案件中对发布禁令非常谨慎的原因。在国境采取措施也可以出于反竞争的目的。执法应该允许对知识产权持有人的合理利益予以保护，但同样也应该对不公平地危害竞争的权利滥用行为加以防范。在美国，“虚假”诉讼的概念可以体现在对程序法的滥用中，例如，基于虚假获得的知识产权、某个明显错误的法律理论或某个已知不可执行的有效权利而采取法律行动，或者原告明知并没有侵权行为发生仍然采取法律行动。

在知识产权法和竞争法的范畴内都可以使用强制许可来对反竞争行为进行救济。TRIPS 协议第31 条k 款，明确地提供了专利案件中授予强制许可的条件。例如，在美国，在竞争法下授予强制许可的条件就包括：把专利作为支配企业固定价格或限制市场准入的基础、专利在集中市场的企业合并中发挥重要作用、超越被授予专利的主体范围而来扩展专利限制范畴的行为等。强制许可也可以被用于不适当地限制了竞争的交叉许可案件中，尤其是与那些独立于其本身特点，事实上或潜在地存在互相竞争关系的替代技术有关。

“专利池”代表着另一个可以从竞争政策的角度进行分析的领域。这样的专利池可能被用于支持竞争的目的，但是也可能造成多样化市场上默认的一种串谋关系，使得参加联营的成员可以通过制定不合理的条件，对希望获得该技术的非成员滥用其权利。

最后，还有其他一些知识产权发挥重要作用的领域，而政府采取的行动将对竞争关系产生决定性影响。这其中就包括政府决定的关于药品和农用化学品上市许可要求的法规。在一些国家还适用着通过自由贸易协定建立起来的独特的数据独占权体系，向第一位申请人（通常是开发该新产品的公司）授予一种临时的垄断使用有关数据的权利，从而在独占期内排除仿制药的竞争。对于竞争的限制还可以表现在“专利-注册连接”的问题上，根据这种制度，当某种药品与专利有关，而生产该药品的申请人没有获得专利所有人同意时，该国家的卫生部门不能批准该药品上市，或必须采取某些法律措施。

总结来说，知识产权法的设计和适用不能脱离于其他的法律学科，尤其是竞争法。“竞争政策”这种方法指出，在知识产权领域建立和保持市场上的竞争关系，不仅仅是竞争法或者反垄断法机构的职责。在竞争和知识产权之间确定一种正确的平衡关系，是一系列政策和机制的共同目标。以下是一些对发展中国家提出的建议：

- 建立或加强竞争法，从而和其他部门法一起，控制那些与知识产权的获得及行使有关的滥用行为；

- 考虑一系列决定市场准入的政策和机制对竞争的影响，例如药品和农用化学品的上市许可；

- 确保在竞争法主管部门和其他对市场结构和运作有决定作用的部门之间建立一种适当的协调机制，以维持竞争环境；

- 充分行使TRIPS 协议所允许的灵活性，授予强制许可从而对与知识产权有关的反竞争行为进行救济；

- 特别是考虑在拒绝交易的情况下授予强制许可；

- 概念化并适用“必要设施原则”，考虑相应的市场环境和公共需求来处理必要技术的控制问题；

- 制定政策（包括指南）来阻止和纠正知识产权获得和执法的滥用问题；

- 考虑那些通常会导致反竞争行为的情形，如一揽子专利或专利丛林；

- 在专利局中采用指南，阻止授予无意义的或低质量的专利，以及权利要求过于宽泛的专利——这些专利可能被不当地使用从而限制合法的竞争并阻止创新；

- 避免“专利连接”和数据独占权，从而促进市场上被监管产品之间的竞争。

The value chain approach has become an increasingly important framework for examining changes in the global trade of commodities and their implications for primary producers. Rather than describing the broad patterns of global exchange and assessing their consequences for producers and consumers exclusively through market mechanisms and equilibrium price changes, the global value chain (GVC) framework encompasses the production, processing, distribution and marketing of specific globally-traded commodities, and identifies the main stakeholders involved at each stage. It also highlights governance patterns (how these different stages are coordinated) and specifies the role of lead firms in determining market access, defining products and value across the chain (Schmitz, 2005).

The commodity studies in this paper focus on four themes: changes in the geography of production, changes in chain governance, new developments in trade agreements and their impacts on primary producers in different developing countries, and initiatives towards sustainable production, ethical trade and worker welfare. With regard to changes in production, the paper provides insights into new developments in the production of bananas, sugar, palm oil and cut flowers, which have been driven by changes in trade agreements and new investment patterns. In several of the commodities concerned, an important development has been the rise of new low cost producers who will play a role in shaping the global market for these commodities.

This paper was produced under an ICTSD dialogue and research project which seeks to address the opportunities and challenges of the full liberalisation of trade in tropical and diversification products, and explores possible areas of convergence between different groupings and interests in WTO negotiations. The project seeks to generate solutions-oriented analyses and possible policy responses from a sustainable development perspective.

Multilateral discussions on the full liberalization of trade in tropical and diversification products have focused almost exclusively on the reduction of tariffs, and tariff escalation for those products and the overlap with the mandate on preference erosion. There has been no debate and analysis on NTBs and more specifically on SPS measures and technical barriers to trade (TBTs). This is surprising, since as the following paper reveals, imports of tropical and diversification products from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and some Latin American countries are particularly affected by SPS and TBT measures.

The following work, entitled “Trade Effects of SPS and TBT Measures on Tropical and Diversification Products,” also reveals that ACP countries are the exporters for which the most sectors are influenced negatively and significantly by SPS measures and TBTs. As such, this paper represents a contribution to a knowledge-based discussion in this area.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the trade effects of SPS measures and TBTs on tropical and diversification products. The authors examine to what extent and for what products SPS and technical requirements under public law represent barriers for exports of tropical and diversification products to enter developed countries’ markets, namely the European Union (EU), the United States (US), Japan, Canada, Australia and Switzerland. The objective of the study is also to generate solution-oriented analyses and to identify possible policy responses.

By way of introduction, the paper provides information on the SPS and TBT agreements, the private sector requirements and NTBs to trade. The paper presents case studies documenting the effects of SPS and TBT measures on producers and exporters. These cases studies are based on surveys and interviews. They focus on production and export of bananas and pineapples in Ecuador, bananas, melons and pineapples in Costa Rica, coffee in Ethiopia and cut flowers in Kenya.

The paper provides a statistical analysis of SPS and TBT measures applied by main developed countries on their imports of tropical and diversification products. Results of the surveys and case studies are not easily generalized. The main advantage of the statistical analysis is to be more exhaustive. This analysis reveals information on the types of measure used (authorizations, technical measures), the motives to impose SPS and TBT measures on tropical and diversification products, the number of notifications by country, the stringency of SPS and TBT measures, and the affected exports. Furthermore, the paper presents econometrical estimations of the trade impacts of public standards through the gravity equation.

Finally, the paper describes the existing technical assistance programmes to help farmers and exporters of developing countries to conform with SPS and TBT requirements adopted by main developed markets. It assesses their strengths and weaknesses, and it provides recommendations to improve their efficiency. The paper analyses how the Aid for Trade initiative can help developing countries to meet these standards. Additional policy responses resulting from the study are also suggested.

There are no studies estimating the importance of tropical and other commodities using economic, social and foreign trade indicators. Nonetheless, the participation of such products in exports from developing countries is significant: the twenty main tropical products account for 36 percent of developing countries’ incoming foreign currency from agricultural exports. This proportion reaches 46 percent for low income developing countries (Perry, 2008). Many of these products are grown primarily by small farmers in developing countries – as in the case of coffee, cocoa, tobacco and cotton. Others (i.e. sugar, rubber and rice) are vital in the generation of rural employment. Therefore, besides their considerable contribution to foreign currency generation, they also play an important role from a social point of view.

The built-in agenda of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture reflects the longstanding priority attached to tropical and diversification products, that “having agreed that in implementing their commitments on market access, developed country Members would take fully into account the particular needs and conditions of developing country Members by providing for a greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of particular interest to these Members, including the fullest liberalisation of trade in tropical agricultural products […].” The 2004 Framework Agreement reached during the Doha Round notes that the full implementation of the liberalisation of trade in tropical agricultural products is “overdue and will be addressed effectively in the market access negotiations.” However, the way in which the commitment is to be implemented and even the identification of such products remain far from clear.

In the last decade, the commodity issues have re-emerged as central to development initiatives and poverty alleviation strategies. The objective of this Issue Paper by Charles Mather is to contribute to this debate by providing an analysis of the value chains of four tropical commodities (bananas, sugar, cut flowers and palm oil) in a rapidly changing global trade environment. The author seeks to provide insights on the different ways the significant changes occurring in the structure and governance of commodity chains ultimately affect producers’ income and production sustainability. He also suggests recommendations to improve these two variables.

The value chain approach has become an increasingly important framework for examining changes in the global trade of commodities and their implications for primary producers. Rather than describing the broad patterns of global exchange and assessing their consequences for producers and consumers exclusively through market mechanisms and equilibrium price changes, the global value chain (GVC) framework encompasses the production, processing, distribution and marketing of specific globally-traded commodities, and identifies the main stakeholders involved at each stage. It also highlights governance patterns (how these different stages are coordinated) and specifies the role of lead firms in determining market access, defining products and value across the chain (Schmitz, 2005).

The commodity studies in this paper focus on four themes: changes in the geography of production, changes in chain governance, new developments in trade agreements and their impacts on primary producers in different developing countries, and initiatives towards sustainable production, ethical trade and worker welfare. With regard to changes in production, the paper provides insights into new developments in the production of bananas, sugar, palm oil and cut flowers, which have been driven by changes in trade agreements and new investment patterns. In several of the commodities concerned, an important development has been the rise of new low cost producers who will play a role in shaping the global market for these commodities.

This paper was produced under an ICTSD dialogue and research project which seeks to address the opportunities and challenges of the full liberalisation of trade in tropical and diversification products, and explores possible areas of convergence between different groupings and interests in WTO negotiations. The project seeks to generate solutions-oriented analyses and possible policy responses from a sustainable development perspective.

This paper was produced under an ICTSD dialogue and research project that seeks to address the opportunities and challenges of the full liberalisation of trade in tropical and diversification products, and to explore possible areas of convergence between different groupings and interests in WTO negotiations. The project aims to generate solutions-oriented analyses and possible policy responses from a sustainable development perspective. This paper is reflective of this objective.

Yet, despite this growth, the sector remains largely underdeveloped and its regulatory framework is inadequate. Most developing countries have had difficulties articulating their negotiating positions at the international level beyond rhetoric and general statements. For some, this is simply a lack of genuine understanding or familiarity with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the WTO negotiating context, which is symptomatic of a lack of deeper, substantive knowledge of their interests in specific sectors and modes of supply and rules. This also speaks to deficient human resources in relation to negotiating capacity. In addition, many LDCs continue to be compounded by a lack of data or real statistics on trade in services.

To address this concern, ICTSD commissioned a series of studies on the opportunities and risks of liberalising services trade in selected developing countries as part of its programme on Trade in Services and Sustainable Development. Among the work commissioned was a country study on Mozambique.

Like many developing and least developed countries, Mozambique’s services sector is an increasingly important dimension of the country’s economic development in terms of both its contribution to growth and its development potential. The present study, produced in collaboration with the Economic Justice Coalition, shows that services like transport, electricity and tourism are highly tradable. These are also priority sectors for Mozambique, which is fast becoming an exporter of these goods. In addition, Mozambique’s strategic geographic location also makes it a natural regional transport and service hub connecting several countries in Southern Africa namely: Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This is evidenced by the major role it plays in rendering transport and logistical services to the region.

Moreover, as demonstrated throughout the study, liberalisation can play a positive role in improving the competitiveness of the goods sector and other services, as well as increasing the efficiency of domestic services sectors and export opportunities. Yet, as also explored in the paper, there is a serious lack of socio-economic assessments and of an understanding of the full implications of the liberalisation and privatisation of services.

In an effort to fill this gap, this study aims to improve the understanding of linkages between possible services liberalisation (undertaken in the GATS context, where appropriate) and key public policy objectives in selected sectors; to enhance understanding of national market structures in the selected sectors and modes of supply, including on the strengths and weaknesses of the domestic services sector and existing trade flows; to facilitate interaction among Geneva-based services negotiators, national policy-makers from relevant ministries, the business community, academia and civil society actors; to identify priority sectors and sub-sectors of particular relevance to the country, define elements and conditions for trade liberalisation, market and regulatory reform, taking into account specific requests received in the GATS negotiations; and lastly, to involve national stakeholders in the definition of domestic negotiating positions.

This study comes at an opportune time for Mozambique. The opportunities and risks of liberalising trade in services are delicately balanced in an environment where regulatory and institutional authorities have been established only relatively recently, and in which restructuring is still in progress. By implementing concerted measures for macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms, the country looks to transform its economy towards a higher degree of openness and export orientation. In this context, the paper provides a much needed backstopping analysis for the definition of Mozambique’s negotiating interests in bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations.