La relación entre la propiedad intelectual (PI) y las disciplinas que regulan la competencia ha atraído cada vez más atención, en particular, como resultado de la expansión y el fortalecimiento de la protección de la PI a escala global. Mientras que la legislación en materia de PI somete deliberadamente un activo intelectual al control exclusivo de los titulares del derecho, el derecho de la competencia procura evitar las barreras de mercado y beneficiar a los consumidores alentando la competencia entre una multiplicidad de proveedores de bienes, servicios y tecnologías. Ocuparse de una relación de esta naturaleza impone, a los responsables del diseño de políticas, desafíos analíticos de carácter único (Kovacic, 2005, p. 2).

Disponsible ahora en enspanol…

A new study shows that Doha market access promises to least-developed countries (LDCs) would be undermined by barriers to key exports. This groundbreaking report was released in advance of the Mini-Ministerial trade talks held at the WTO headquarters in Geneva during the last two weeks in July.

As trade ministers gathered at the WTO to try and reach a compromise in the global trade talks, one of the main objectives was to help the world’s poorest countries expand their participation in global trade through the successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round. But, promises by industrialised nations to grant unrestricted market access to exports from LDCs as part of a WTO deal would be rendered practically worthless unless they cover all products, according to this new study commissioned by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. In this paper, it is estimated how LDCs’ access to rich and selected emerging markets would be affected by excluding certain products from liberalisation.

WTO members agreed in 2005 to make it mandatory for developed countries, and optional for developing countries, to give duty- and quota-free market access to all exports from least-developed countries (LDCs). They insisted on being allowed to exclude up to 3% of tariff lines from this so-called ‘Duty Free Quota Free Market Access’ (DFQFMA) initiative, in order to protect sensitive sectors.

This recent study shows that this exception could suffice to cover the small handful of products that LDCs make and export competitively. “In most developed country markets, 3% of tariff lines cover between 90% and 98% of exports from LDCs,” found author David Laborde. “The 3 % exclusion manages to neutralize the initiative almost completely in developed country markets,” he wrote.

Extending duty- and quota-free coverage to all products, however, would minimise the harm caused to LDCs by multilateral tariff cuts under a Doha agreement, the study found. When rich countries lower import barriers to products from China, India, Brazil, and the industrialised world, it inevitably erodes the trade preferences that LDCs enjoy in their markets. But with full duty and quota-free market access for LDCs, these losses are confined to a much smaller number of countries.

The study demonstrates that giving LDCs duty-free market access and simple rules of origin leads to export growth and diversification. As the Director of Programmes at ICTSD, Christophe Bellman, said, “Quite simply, duty-free quota-free access for LDCs works.”

This study summarizes the key issues and methodologies used in the negotiations; it employs a set of indicators and domestic consumption data to identify tariff lines likely to be declared sensitive; and it suggests which countries are most likely to be affected. The work also looks at how different scenarios will lead to varying degrees of market opening through quota expansion and specifies which exporting countries and products will be most affected.

*Due to the number and breadth of tables generated by this paper they are also available as a seperate file included in this post.

This paper provides an overview assessment of the implications of the revised modalities text in terms of its ambition and balance as viewed from the perspective of both developed and developing countries, and identifies the key issues which will likely require ministerial decisions. It goes on to examine what additional issues could be added as part of a final deal once there is agreement on modalities and there is an assessment of the ensuing draft schedules.

It concludes by venturing some views on the likely trade-offs between agriculture and other parts of the Doha negotiations, particularly the non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations. This assessment draws from and builds on the complementary detailed analysis which has been undertaken on the implications of the new draft modalities text for four major Doha participants - the US, EU, Brazil and India.

Cover photo by vsz.

在12月联合国气候变化大会期间，来自美国、巴西、日本、欧盟、中国和印度等多的部长和高级贸易官员参加了在巴厘岛举行的非正式贸易部长会议。此次会议由印度尼西亚贸易部长彭加斯图召集，是有史以来讨论国际贸易和气候变化体制的关系的第一次如此高规格的会议。今年的联合国气候变化大会，旨在启动新的谈判进程达成新的框架协议来接替2012年到期的《京都议定书》。一个主要目标是控制温室气体的排放，从而使全球平均温度稳定在一定的范围，即：比工业化以前时期的温度略高2摄氏度以内的水平。许多科学家和决策者认为必须把温度控制在这个水平才能避免气候变化朝着不可逆转的方向发展。

参加贸易部长会议的代表认为，与贸易相似，气候变化同样需要多边的解决方案，应当对单边主义保持谨慎。代表们认为，决策者必须考虑贸易应当如何为应对气候变化做出贡献。尽管大家意识到贸易和气候变化可以在某些领域相互支撑，但是冲突也在所难免，特别是在有关后《京都议定书》承诺的谈判过程中更是如此。

参加此次非正式部长会议的代表指出，标准、补贴、税收和知识产权等WTO规则将有助于应对气候变化。部长们指出，为了气候变化的目标使用这些WTO规则应在一个清晰的多边环境框架协议的指引下进行。WTO总干事拉米也参加了此次会议，他认为一些相关的贸易规则“确实可以用来应对气候变化，并且，如果WTO成员）政府认为有必要的话，可以（对这些贸易规则）予以调整以更好地实现（应对气候变化的）目标”。

竞争力和边境调节税

尽管贸易官员有意就气候变化问题达成协议，所有的与会代表都明确地表示这个问题应主要在环境舞台上解决。WTO总干事拉米强调，“WTO不是一个达成气候变化协议的地方，应当是在环境事务的论坛，比如联合国气候变化大会”。

欧盟贸易官员奥苏利文警告说，如果不能就气候变化达成全球协议的话，将使得国际贸易关系更加错综复杂：一些政府可能发现他们将不得不采取贸易政策工具来实现控制气候变化的目标，比如对某些进口实行有争议的边境调节税（border tax adjustments）。

即使达成气候变化的协议，如果该协议没有把所有主要经济体纳入其中，仍将诱发贸易关系的紧张，因为一些政府将出于竞争力的考虑，对没有采取措施实施减排目标的国家的产品出口采取相应贸易限制措施。事实上，一些政治领导人，特别是在欧洲，已经呼吁对那些来自没有签署京都议定书或者没有承担减排义务的国家的进口产品征收额外关税。他们声称，这将一方面为其本国产品提供公平竞争的环境，另一方面鼓励其他国家参加到全球减缓气候变化的努力中来。

绝大多数的代表对使用贸易限制措施的提议表示谨慎，无论这一政策提议是为了敦促其他国家一起参与应对气候变化的努力，还是是为了平衡竞争力的担忧。美国贸易代表施瓦布强调，“WTO成员应谨慎地避免那些以应对气候变化的名义仓促限制贸易”，“贸易在促进‘对气候友好’的经济增长和发展方面可以发挥一些作用，但是不应当被看作是减缓气候变化所有问题的答案”。施瓦布强调，“综合性的方案应当关注可持续发展的多个层面，包括经济增长，环境效应和能源安全”。

中国等一些发展中国家的代表指出发展中国家需要发展，因此关于气候变化的未来行动，对穷国应遵守“共同而有区别的责任”之原则。这一方面是因为工业化国家对大气层中的温室气体承担历史责任，同时也是因为任何应对气候变化的步骤必须给予发展中国家足够的空间来发展。中国、印度等国指出严厉的限制排放约束将制约穷国的经济增长。阿根廷和墨西哥代表强调发展的权利必须得到维护。

环境产品和服务贸易的自由化

参加此次贸易官员会议的代表讨论了低碳产品的贸易自由化可能带来的潜在收益，此类产品包括可持续能源技术和污染控制设备等。

拉米在发言中指出，正在进行的多哈回合中关于环境产品和服务贸易自由化的谈判可以“为一些成员带来双赢的效果：有益于环境，有益于贸易”。他同时也强调市场开放必须在适当的环境框架下进行，目前急需各国政府设立好这样的环境框架。

与会代表讨论了最近由美国和欧盟向所有WTO成员提出的议案，建议将世界银行列出的43项可以直接提供气候变化收益的产品贸易予以自由化，从风能发动机到锅炉和氢电池。

支持者认为这是贸易可以为应对气候变化作出的最直接的贡献。日本在表示支持的同时提出，如果能够把混合动力汽车（日本处于世界领先地位）包括进这个清单就更好了。

批评者之一是巴西。巴西外交部长阿墨林认为欧美的清单遗漏了“能够证明在控制气候变化中功绩卓著的一项产品——乙醇”。他指出，过去三十年间巴西使用的乙醇避免了6.7亿吨的二氧化碳排放。巴西是乙醇的主要生产国，而在欧盟和美国乙醇受到严格的贸易保护，而且接受大量的补贴。

阿墨林指出对不同生物燃料（biofuels）在关税分类方面的反常现象：生物柴油被列为工业品，而乙醇被列为农产品（从而使得发达国家更容易对国内产品进行关税保护）。他认为这种分类方法应当予以纠正。他还指出乙醇市场的自由化将有益于其他与巴西有类似条件的发展中国家。

巴西的呼吁得到瑞典和日本的积极回应，其中日本认为生物燃料应当纳入能源安全的范畴加以考虑。欧盟承认关于生物燃料在WTO中的分类的确存在一些问题，但是重新分类的程序相当复杂，虽然它并没有完全排除这种可能。

一些代表指责欧美提出的贸易自由化清单只考虑到工业化国家的出口利益。美国贸易代表施瓦布反驳时指出，事实上，2006年美国是这43项产品的净进口国，进口总额180亿美元，其中30亿美元是净进口。她附带指出，美国这些产品的两个最大进口国是发展中国家，墨西哥和中国。

国际贸易的碳足迹（carbon footprint）

讨论还涉及国际贸易的运输带来的温室气体排放问题。与会代表反对简单地引入碳足迹指标来限制国际贸易。他们指出国际贸易带来的排放量不足总排放量的2%，但是如果因此而设立贸易壁垒将严重的惩罚穷国，而这些穷国根本不是造成气候变化的原因。

发言人指出，不应当只孤立地盯住运输，而应当看到从生产到消费的更大范围的碳循环。拉米引用了一项研究报告指出，与荷兰生产的一颗花卉相比较，从肯尼亚空运到欧洲的花卉所带来的二氧化碳排放量要少三分之二。

施瓦布也指出，“仅仅看到货物运输中使用的能源，而忽略贸易对生产率和削减贫困的贡献，是一个误导”。

技术合作，知识产权和清洁发展机制

技术合作将成为后京都气候框架的核心部分。发展中国家一直以来努力推动更加有效的方法来促进来自发达国家的技术转移，正如联合国气候变化大会所要求的那样。

来自中国和印度的官员对在获取国外技术方面面临的种种壁垒表示担忧。印度特别提到知识产权保护是一个潜在的障碍，呼吁考虑重新审查WTO知识产权制度，从而确保他们充分地回应成员方寻求技术转移的目标。

一些代表警告，削弱知识产权制度将减缓创新，从而产生严重的负面影响。欧盟呼吁探索技术创新方案，从而一方面支持对气候友好技术的更加迅捷的扩散，另一方面也不损害知识产权制度的完整性。巴西指出，巴西已经运用WTO知识产权协定中止药品的专利、允许生产便宜的非专利药品，从而扩大了艾滋病治疗方案的范围；建议采纳类似的“强制许可”之灵活性来清洁技术能够在更大的范围内得到推广应用。

联合国贸发会议秘书长素帕猜在会议上谈到运用清洁发展机制（Clean Development Mechanism）的潜力。作为京都议定书的一项安排，该机制允许工业化国家在发展中国家投资旨在减少温室气体排放的项目，作为一种更廉价的方案来替代其在国内的减排任务，从而促进向发展中国家的技术转移。

部长们呼吁就国际贸易和气候变化进行进一步的高层互动，比如在WTO或联合国贸发会议的支持下开展深入讨论。与会者要求联合国气候变化大会今后的东道主继续召集类似会议，可以考虑邀请财政及发展部门官员一起讨论。

中国的选择

从此次会议的讨论和以往的政府声明来看，中国代表强调的“发展中国家需要发展”、“发展排放”和“转移排放”的理念，“应遵守共同而有区别的责任”的原则，是适当和合理的。但是，由于中国的庞大的贸易量和温室气体排放的潜在增长规模，在今后较长一段时间内，中国将难以避免地成为贸易和气候变化讨论中的一个焦点。因此，中国需要在这些理念和原则的基础上不断的提出切实可行的战略。

这既是一个挑战，同时也是一个机会，使我们可以在贸易和气候变化的全球治理中发挥积极的作用。

从贸易部长会议讨论的观点来看，在总体上，中国的盟友选择面是比较广阔的。在抵制边境调节税方面，中国和美国及广大发展中国家观点比较一致；在环境产品和服务的自由化方面，中国和很多WTO成员一样，贸易收益和环境收益可以实现整体平衡；在对待碳足迹和贸易设限方面，中国继续与主要贸易国一样持谨慎抵制立场；在技术合作和技术转让方面，一些发展中国家和部分发达国家关于知识产权灵活性和更好运用清洁发展机制的提议值得我们跟踪和深入挖掘。

具体而言，当前需要特别引起注意的是欧盟和美国正在酝酿的贸易设限提议。由于这些提议一旦落地具有较大的行政任意性和法律复杂性，将对整个国际贸易环境造成灾难性的损伤，对中国贸易发展极为不利。在国际贸易和可持续发展中心（ICTSD）举办的上海国际研讨会上，专家建议中国可以从三个方面予以准备。

一是推动多边框架下的应对方案，在联合国气候变化大会或者WTO达成规则，禁止所有成员出于气候变化原因对贸易设限。建议积极推动在环境产品和服务自由化、技术转让方面的多边谈判，来换取有关成员承诺不采取与气候变化有关的边境贸易限制措施。这是上上策。

二是考虑在国内引入碳税，或者承担国际减排义务，从根本上平衡发达国家设立贸易限制措施的借口。但是从中国产业竞争力和经济增长的要求来看，国内征收碳税还为时过早。从道义上看，发达国家对温室气体排放负有不可推卸的历史责任，中国人均碳排放水平较低，应当争取合理的发展空间，因此在国际协定中承诺具体的减排义务也不现实。这是下策。

第三，继续支持国内和国际的实证研究，寻求建立贸易和气候变化积极互动的政策框架，服务于中国的利益，发展中国家的利益和全球可持续发展的利益。比如，从全球碳循环的角度分析碳排放的跨国界转移，如高排放产业的国际转移，生产者和消费者之间的碳转移。这不仅仅是为了维护中国的立场，而是为寻求公正的全球解决方案提供实证的依据。再比如，从可持续发展的全面性的角度分析贸易、气候变化和发展之间的关系，考虑到贸易和气候变化政策对发展中国家的经济增长、环境和社会发展的综合影响。积累这样的知识将是一个长期的过程，是一项长期投资，不仅有益于中国，也有益于地球。

AMNA

Luego de que se divulgara el texto del Presidente del grupo de negociación sobre AMNA, Don Stephenson, los comentarios de los Miembros no se hicieron esperar.

Los EE.UU. y la UE habían sido muy críticos por considerar que el texto revisado otorgaba mayores flexibilidades a los países en desarrollo, algo que ellos no estaban dispuestos a aceptar. Por su parte, el grupo NAMA-11 (integrado entre otros por Argentina, Brasil, Egipto, India, Sudáfrica y Venezuela), consideró que el texto del presidente solicita mayores reducciones arancelarias a los países en desarrollo que a las naciones industrializadas.

Al término de la reunión celebrada el 28 de mayo, Stephenson se había mostrado muy decepcionado con las primeras reacciones de los Miembros. Él había mencionado que sin un cambio de sintonía, los países no lograrían hacer progresos en las semanas sucesivas. El presidente había advertido que estaba preparado para interrumpir las discusiones si los gobiernos no intentaban seriamente resolver sus diferencias.

Dichas discrepancias están centradas básicamente en dos temas: los ‘coeficientes’, que determinan los futuros topes arancelarios para las naciones industrializadas y para los aproximadamente 30 países en desarrollo que tendrían que sujetarse al resultado de la negociación, y las ‘flexibilidades’ para las naciones en desarrollo, que servirán para proteger algunos productos de esas reducciones.

Las previsiones hechas por Stephenson se cumplieron. En efecto, el presidente de las negociaciones sobre AMNA decidió apenas el día de ayer suspender las discusiones “hasta que los Miembros alcancen cierto grado de convergencia”, según señaló. En síntesis, Stephenson alegó durante una reunión en la OMC, que los negociadores habían “reabierto” asuntos ya acordados, que aún mantenían sus diferencias y que muchos habían adoptado posiciones aun más extremas al respecto. Stephenson dijo que debido a tales posiciones los negociadores no habían “logrado nada”.

A pesar de que el presidente notó un poco mas de “compromiso en el proceso de AMNA”, sostuvo que dicho compromiso no se ha reflejado en las negociaciones. “Es tiempo de que los negociadores y los funcionarios de alto nivel asum[an] su responsabilidad y trabaj[en] para acercar sus posiciones”, advirtió.

Fuentes consultadas sostuvieron que la intención de algunas delegaciones es mantener reuniones entre funcionarios de alto nivel, fuera del ámbito del grupo de negociación. Las mismas estarían lideradas por EE.UU. y contarían con la participación de Brasil, China, Hong Kong, México, India, Sudáfrica y la UE, entre otros. Las reuniones se llevarían a cabo a partir de la semana del 9 de junio en Ginebra. Las mismas fuentes sostuvieron que Stephenson podría esperar algún tipo de ‘acuerdo’ antes de decidir retomar las negociaciones nuevamente.

Agricultura

Por otra parte, las críticas al texto elaborado por el presidente del grupo de negociaciones sobre agricultura, Crawford Falconer, si bien menos extremas, han estado presentes.

La coalición G-20, conformada por países en desarrollo y que aboga por una reforma agrícola en los países desarrollados, había dicho que el texto en cuestión representaba una “buena base para construir”. Dicho grupo, en el que se encuentran países como Brasil, China e India, declaró también que estaba listo para trabajar en pos de “reducir las diferencias”. Según esta coalición, los resultados de las reuniones que se están llevando a cabo y que comenzaron la semana pasada, serán luego incluidos en el documento presentado por el Embajador Falconer.

Mayores reducciones en los subsidios a causa del alza en los precios de los alimentos

Durante la reunión abierta a todos los miembros de la OMC, que se desarrolló el 26 de mayo pasado, muchos participantes hicieron referencia al dramático aumento de los precios internacionales de los productos básicos, y solicitaron mayores reducciones en los subsidios agrícolas. El G-20 dijo al respecto que debido a los actuales precios de los alimentos y para que los países desarrollados cumplan con el compromiso de realizar reducciones arancelarias efectivas, será necesario que dichos países lleven a cabo recortes importantes.

Las disputas continúan por el acceso a los mercados

Los miembros del Grupo Cairns, que representan a los países agro exportadores, y el G-20, le habían solicitado el presidente Falconer que introdujera un tope para todos los aranceles agrícolas. La UE y el G-10, que agrupa a los importadores netos de productos agrícolas, se han manifestado en contra de dicha medida. Actualmente el documento agrícola prevé que los países que apliquen aranceles superiores al 100% en muchos productos, en consecuencia deberán compensar a través de un aumento en las cuotas arancelarias.

Las reuniones que comenzaron la semana pasada y que aún continúan hasta hoy día, tienen como finalidad que los Miembros puedan manifestar sus preocupaciones. Entre las más frecuente está la necesidad de buscar mayor claridad en el lenguaje que utilizó el presidente Falconer para escribir el texto. Los delegados están convencidos que este ejercicio les servirá para obtener un texto revisado que se acerque más a sus expectativas.

Otros de los temas que ha predominado en esas reuniones se relaciona con la nueva ley agrícola de los EE.UU. (ver nota relacionada en este número). En efecto, Brasil, en representación del G-20, y Australia, en representación del Grupo Cairns, criticaron a la ley agrícola por no estar en línea con la normativa de la OMC.

Muchos negociadores esperan que al término de dichas reuniones Falconer elabore una versión revisada de su texto; algunas fuentes especulan que esto podría suceder a finales de junio.

La practica en la OMC ha mostrado que a pesar de que las negociaciones de ANMA puedan suspenderse, sus homologas en agricultura y servicios pueden seguir adelante, lo que no quiere decir necesariamente que se llegará a un acuerdo.

Reportaje de ICTSD y CINPE.

Applying the formula by bands will result in an overall cut of 38 percent in the average tradeweighted bound tariffs from 159 percent to 99 percent. However, flexibilities increase the bound rates to 126 percent, resulting in a net reduction of 21 percent, well below the maximum cut of 36 percent proposed for developing countries. Although the formula reduces tariff heterogeneity, measured by the standard deviation, flexibilities restore heterogeneity to initial levels in key products sustaining potential distortions in Indian agriculture. The average applied rate would fall to 54 percent from an initial 59 percent after the formula cut, but flexibilities completely eliminate the reduction. In terms of preferences, only duty-free, quota-free access to least developed countries, if granted, would result in significant changes in India’s applied protection. In general, the formula cut with flexibilities does not appear to open India’s market and may not lead to less heterogeneity in the protection structure. India is a net agricultural exporter, but the modalities offer significant liberalization on only 30 percent of Indian exports; the ones targeting developed economies. India’s strong support of special and differential treatment opens few new market opportunities in developing countries.

In the Uruguay Round, India did not have a total AMS commitment, and so, the de minimis exemptions served as limits to two types of domestic support: administered prices under product-specific AMS and input subsidies under non-product-specific AMS. Official notifications, available for 1995-1997, show negative product-specific AMS because support prices are lower than external reference prices. Moreover, a reallocation of input subsidies from non-product-specific AMS to special and differential treatment reduces the former to about 1 percent of the value of production. A recent set of shadow notifications shows that India’s product-specific AMS remained negative through 2005. Non-product-specific AMS, computed similar to that in the official notifications, accounts for about 1 percent of the value of agricultural production. With India’s general elections expected in early 2009, the immediate future includes popular policies such as credit subsidies and significant MSP growth. Nevertheless, non-product-specific AMS is not likely to exceed the limits proposed in the Doha Round, i.e., 10 percent of value of production, even with popular policies. However, product-specific AMS is on the verge of becoming positive given high growth in support prices and the appreciation of Rupee in recent years. Projections for 2015 suggest that de minimis exemptions would be about $16 billion each for product-specific and non-product-specific AMS, giving India ample flexibility in domestic support policies.

This new position has indeed had a major impact on the conduct of the negotiations. Although transatlantic tensions still exist, often over issues such as regulations regarding biotech food and the use of place names for trademarks, the past five years has seen a noticeable convergence of EU and US positions on agricultural trade rules. The conflicts that are prolonging the Doha Round agricultural talks are more often between the US and the EU on the one hand and developing countries on the other. Both the US and the EU have agreed that there will be significant cuts in tariffs, subject to partial exclusions for sensitive products, and major reductions in the allowable level of trade-distorting domestic support. The elimination of export subsidies is no longer a significant point of contention, although there are still differences in the area of food aid.

The main reason why the EU can be so much less defensive in its approach to trade talks is in the progress it has made with domestic reform of agricultural policy. The MacSharry reforms of 1992 allowed the EU to agree to disciplines on domestic and export subsidies in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), as well as resolving the oilseed controversy. Cereal prices were cut to bring them closer to world prices and oilseed hectarage was restrained. Payments that were made in compensation for price cuts were placed in the Blue Box, and thus avoided mandated reductions. Support given through administered prices also declined, in part as a result of the use of the difference between these prices and fixed reference prices for the calculation of the subsidy element. So the partially-reformed CAP had no difficulty staying within the bounds of the EU’s schedule of subsidy reductions in the first few years.

Further reforms have had a similar impact, lowering the level of trade-distorting subsidies and making it easier for the EU to contemplate and accept further restrictions on agricultural policies in the WTO. In this connection, the changes in 1999 (the Agenda 2000 reforms) and the subsequent significant changes in 2003 and 2004 under the leadership of Commissioner Fischler have continued and developed the approach taken by MacSharry. Price support has been removed or weakened for many commodities, and payments are now made to farmers on the basis of historical production of a wide range of products with no obligation to produce any particular product to claim payment. This “Single Farm Payment” has made the CAP significantly more consistent with the “tariffs and decoupled payments” model that underlies the URAA.

To what extent would a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), along the lines of the modalities in the Revised Draft Modalities paper of May 19, 2008, require further changes in the Common Agricultural Policy? Will those changes be made easier by corresponding disciplines on the domestic programs of other countries? How much increased market access is likely to be generated as a result of cuts in tariffs that would be required of the EU? Can the EU expect to expand its own exports of agricultural products as a result of the tariff cuts of others? Will the termination of the EU’s use of export subsidies to balance its internal market have any significant impact on price levels and on world market conditions? And to what extent will the modification of the export policies of competitors help the EU to move away from export subsidies? What other issues will the EU insist on as it moves towards a package that is acceptable to Member States?

This paper attempts to address these issues, as a way of exploring the domestic and international implications of a Modalities agreement. The first section of the paper gives some background information on the nature of the CAP as it relates to the disciplines introduced in the URAA. This section is useful to give some perspective on the potential impact of the DDA as it relates to the recent development of the CAP. A second section reviews briefly the main “offensive” and “defensive” positions of the EU, so as to be able to evaluate the extent to which the modalities draft addresses these issues. This perspective is relevant to the political reactions that will determine the acceptability of the Modalities. The next three sections discuss in more detail the implications of the domestic support, market access and export competition modalities, and give an interpretation of the WTO disciplines as a constraint on future policy developments. A final section attempts an overall assessment of the impacts of the suggested modalities on the EU and on its negotiating interests.