The EU has played a leading role in international efforts to combat climate change since the issue appeared on the agenda in the 1980s. The EU was the first party to commit to a stabilization target in 1990. It assumed the toughest target under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and it has made the most ambitious offer for Copenhagen with an autonomous target of 20 percent emission reductions by 2020, relative to the 1990 level, or 30 percent “provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable reductions and economically more advanced developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.” The EU has also indicated a willingness to contribute between €2 and 15 billion annually to support adaptation and mitigation actions in developing countries, although the exact number is yet to be fixed by the Council.

The EU has emerged as a leader on climate change despite many obstacles. Collectively, the EU isresponsible for 13.8 percent of current emissions of greenhouse gases, with individual shares ranging from 0.01 to 2.8 percent. None of the Member States are large enough to influence the global emission trajectory in any significant way, nor is the EU as a collective, since global emissions are growing faster than what the EU can offset alone. The leadership is especially interesting in that Member States have veto power over key aspects of climate policy, including fiscal measures and energy policy. The EU cannot order Member States to phase out fossil fuels in favour of renewable energies, nor can the EU impose a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system without the agreement of all Member States.

With the growing recognition that innovation is key for economic growth and development, developing countries are currently considering a range of policies to promote innovation; many of these import or adapt policies from other countries.
 
Multilateral discussions also stress innovation policies: The World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO’s) Development Agenda emphasizes the need to promote creativity and innovation in developing countries (Recommendation 19), and to consider intellectual property (IP) policies that serve this end (Recommendation 25).
 
In this context, several developing countries, including India, Brazil, South Africa, Malaysia, and Jordan, are debating or have recently passed legislation modeled on the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act which facilitated patenting by American research universities.
 
As has been well documented by the proponents of Bayh-Dole type initiatives, since 1981, university patenting and licensing have increased dramatically, as has licensing income from university research. These data provide a main impetus for initiatives to emulate Bayh-Dole in developing countries.
 
The policy brief provides an assessment of one such bill, the Indian Bayh-Dole Act. It focuses on India because legislation is currently under consideration there; however, many of the issues considered are relevant for other developing countries.
 
It suggests that India—and other countries considering legislation of this sort—should provide specific guidance about what sorts of publicly funded research outputs ought to be patented, and what should instead be placed in the public domain.
 
The policy brief underscores the need to evaluate the positive and negative impact of Bayh-Dole type legislation and consider the range of other models and approaches that have evolved in the post-Bayh-Dole era, in response to these concerns.
 
The policy brief is also available at iprsonline.org

Transfer and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies (EST), in particular to developing countries, is a key element of any effective international response to the global climate change challenge and one of the pillars of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). More recently, the Bali Plan of Action called for enhanced action on technology development and transfer.

In this context, the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has been the subject of increased attention in climate change discussions since Bali. Different views and positions have emerged pointing to the role of IPRs in either facilitating or hindering the transfer of EST.

In this regard, the parallel is often made, explicitly or implicitly, by government officials, and other stakeholders, with the access to medicines issue either to reinforce arguments about the role IPRs as an obstacle to the transfer of EST or to dismiss them, in view of the differences between the relative importance of IPRs for the pharmaceutical sector and the renewable energy sector.

Beyond simplistic comparisons and rethorical statements, analysis and research are critically needed to examine, in a constructive manner, lessons to be drawn from the debate on intellectual property and public health to better inform discussions on innovation, technology transfer and IPRs in the context of the climate change negotiations.

Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health by Professor Frederick M. Abbott (Issue Paper No.24) precisely aims to achieve this.

This new issue paper examines different categories of IPRs and the ways they may have different effects and implications for EST as compared with pharmaceutical technologies. It also points to a number of lessons that can be drawn from the public health-related negotiations, at the WTO and other forums, that may be useful to negotiators and policy makers in addressing climate change, transfer of technology and IPRs.

In this connection, the paper underlines that focus should be placed in establishing frameworks for mutually beneficial joint venture economic arrangements between developed and developing country enterprises to stimulate innovation. To the extent possible, technology transfer commitments resulting from climate change negotiations should be specific and concrete. “Soft” commitments on transfer of technology typically do not bear fruit.

Even if current multilateral IPRs rules incorporate flexibilities and exceptions adequate to address most foreseeable obstacles to technology transfer, the paper suggests that a declaration comparable to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health with respect to IPRs and climate change may be useful in the progressive development of international law, so that it properly balances the rights of innovators and access by the public to the benefits arising from new technologies.

Finally, the paper reflects on the urgent need for further evidence based analysis to inform current discussions on climate change, technology transfer and IPRs. For this purpose, and building on previous research in this area, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has joined forces with the European Patent Offi ce (EPO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to undertake a joint project to examine the role of patents in the development and transfer of EST, in particular in the field of energy generation. This initiative is expected to provide input into ongoing discussions on technology transfer in the context of the UNFCCC at COP-15 in Copenhagen.

Ultimately, it is important to recall that IPRs are only one among many other factors which impact technology transfer. Other factors such as the enabling environment, in particular financing, adequate incentives and institutions, do play an essential role and require also vigorous action.

This paper was commissioned under the ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development as part of ICTSD’s Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy which is specifically aimed at contributing to effective international cooperation towards addressing climate change, by advancing analytical capacity of stakeholders and their interaction with policy makers such that effective solutions can be built and agreed by the international community at the Copenhagen COP-15, in December 2009.
__

With the assumption into office of the Obama Administration and its renewed prioritization of climate change issues, the United States Congress has ratcheted up deliberations on various bills, such as the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 3036) and the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act (draft text). Regulations at the sub-federal or state level are likewise increasingly relevant vis-à-vis federal policies. In the European Union, member economies are preparing the next phase of the ‘Emissions Trading System’ and considering options in the absence of a major international agreement to cap greenhouse gas emissions. Japan, Australia and Canada are also deep into consideration of analogous measures.

Despite the obvious ramifications on their countries’ trade competitiveness and sustainable development aspirations, many developing country trade policy-makers and negotiators remain at the fringe of the climate change debate. An enhanced level of understanding of the different approaches evolving among the key OECD countries is crucial if the various stakeholders are to have an enlightened dialogue on the development implications of OECD countries’ domestic policies to address climate change.

In an effort to bridge the different spheres of knowledge and provide opportunity for an exchange of perspectives, particularly among those who are not often included in similar consultative processes, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the Environment and Trade in a World of Interdependence (ENTWINED) Programme organized a dialogue among select representatives from developing country trade and/or economic ministries, think-tanks and universities, Geneva-based developing country ambassadors and a few OECD member country government representatives. The activity, scheduled on Tuesday, 5 May 2009, was hosted by Resources for the Future (RFF)  at the RFF Conference Center in Washington DC. This event was held as a separate and distinct initiative of ICTSD’s Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade Policies and Sustainable Energy but took place in the context of the Washington Dialogue Series slated for the same week. Thru this initiative, ICTSD and ENTWINED hope to:

(i)explore the development aspects of selected OECD countries’ domestic trade policies intended to address climate change, and
(ii)provide a platform for interaction and exchange amongst trade negotiators/policy-makers, private sector representatives, academia and civil society from both OECD as well as developing countries.

Esto a su vez se inserta en un contexto internacional donde la agenda de la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC) y los Acuerdos de Libre Comercio que se multiplican alrededor del mundo, intentan definir el rumbo y la dinámica de los intercambios comerciales entre las regiones y países.

Frente a la OMC y estos procesos de liberación comercial, los Acuerdos Multilaterales de Medio Ambiente (AMUMA) plantean retos y desafíos en la medida que las posiciones de los países desarrollados-orientadas a incrementar niveles y estándares de protección ambiental -se contraponen a la posición de los países en desarrollo que encuentran en estos mismos Acuerdos algunos escollos (por ejemplo en el ámbito laboral, productivo y comercial) que se perciben como limitantes para las posibilidades de progreso social y económico.

Dentro de la OMC, entre los múltiples temas que se abordan y, especialmente como parte de la Ronda de Doha, se encuentra precisamente, cómo compatibilizar la necesidad de promover un crecimiento económico en el tiempo (muchas veces presionando sobre el ambiente y los recursos naturales) al mismo tiempo que se mantienen o mejoran niveles de protección ambiental que permitan el mantenimiento de los sistemas ecológicos y, en general, un medio saludable para los seres humanos.

El trabajo de Jaime García “Hacia una Lista Potencial de Bienes Ambientales para Sudamérica: Criterios para una Perspectiva de Desarrollo Sostenible”, ofrece un análisis bastante pormenorizado de una de las variables más controvertidas dentro de los debates internacionales al interior de la OMC y otros foros. A saber, cómo entender la noción de “bienes ambientales” de manera que permita a los países en desarrollo- especialmente a los países andinos -posicionarse mejor en estas discusiones y sacar ventaja de un hecho incontrastable: una riqueza en términos de biodiversidad a nivel de ecosistemas, especies y recursos genéticos. Paradójicamente, esta enorme riqueza contrasta con niveles de pobreza alarmantes en estos países que inciden en una continua degradación ambiental y la disminución de la calidad de vida en general.

García describe claramente cómo los países desarrollados han logrado (con matices) definir y precisar lo que son bienes ambientales y plantear para ellos, por ejemplo, la eliminación de aranceles. Estos países entienden claramente las implicancias de diferenciar entre definiciones tradicionales de “bienes ambientales” (donde tienen ventajas en las negociaciones internacionales) que incluyen la gestión de la contaminación, la generación de tecnologías limpias y métodos de producción más eficientes y definiciones más amplias que podrían incluir productos ambientales tales como fibras controles biológicos, productos no maderables del bosque, productos resultantes de eco-negocios, entre otros, donde los países en desarrollo tiene más bien mejores posibilidades por explotar en estas mismas negociaciones.

En ese sentido, los países sudamericanos, en esencia, no han logrado por distintas razones tales como el desinterés político, limitadas capacidades institucionales y hasta desconocimiento de la relevancia de los temas, armonizar sus posiciones y en algunos casos tienen una participación casi nula o muy poco relevante en el contexto de las negociaciones internacionales donde se discute sobre los bienes ambientales y el comercio.

Esto último, como lo sugiere el autor, hace evidente una limitada articulación entre actores de la sociedad civil, el sector empresarial y productivo y el Estado en la evaluación de opciones y generación de estrategias para sacar ventajas en el ámbito de las negociaciones comerciales internacionales (especialmente en la OMC) de una mayor riqueza potencial en cuanto a bienes ambientales casi connaturales al medio geográfico y ecológico de estos países.

El trabajo de García se hace también bastante digerible en la medida que incluye una serie de conclusiones y recomendaciones pertinentes al tema de los bienes ambientales. Los anexos y especialmente a bibliografía utilizada ofrecen una herramienta útil para profundizar y ampliar el análisis de los temas.

Jaime García es Economista y catedrático de la Universidad de Lima y su investigación fue financiada a través del Programa de Bienes y Servicios Ambientales del Centro Internacional para el Comercio y el Desarrollo Sostenible (ICTSD) con sede en Ginebra, Suiza y que a su vez ha sido apoyado por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Luxemburgo.

Sin duda, el trabajo de García constituye un excelente esfuerzo por sistematizar y sintetizar información y datos relevantes para a partir de ello proponer algunas reflexiones que deben contribuir a despertar el interés de los países y sus diferentes actores en los procesos de negociación comercial- ambiental internacional, con particular énfasis en las actualmente un tanto lentas negociaciones en el ámbito de la OMC.

In contrast to the EU, which took a defensive position in the Uruguay Round but has been playing a more active role in the current Doha Round, Japan has maintained the defensive position it has taken in previous Rounds.

In 1992, at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the EU instituted reforms, significantly lowering support prices for grain and beef and compensating farmers by paying them directly. Lowering prices enabled the EU to allow the volume of subsidized exports to be reduced through reductions in surpluses.

The EU has subsequently continued its reform process. In the 2000 reform, it reduced the support price of cereals by 15 percent, and in the 2003 reform reduced the support prices on dairy products, with the price of skimmed milk powder being lowered by 15 percent and that for butter by 25 percent.

In the 2005 reform, the EU finally reduced the support price for sugar (previously unchanged for 40 years) by 36 percent, and switched to direct payments corresponding to 64 percent of the price reduction. For these reasons, the EU could make a commitment to eliminate export subsidies for sugar, dairy products, cereals and beef, and could tolerate 100 percent tariff caps in the current Doha Round of negotiations.

Since the 1960s, price support has dominated Japan’s agricultural policy, supporting farmers’ incomes but placing a huge burden on consumers. In order to maintain high prices, Japan has had to rely on tariffs and non-tariff measures so as to isolate its domestic market from the international market.

In the Uruguay Round, the country resisted tariffication and resorted to special treatment stipulated in Annex 5 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), compensating for not tariffying rice by providing more minimum access than would have otherwise been required. Japan, however, finally recognized that it could no longer bear the excessive minimum access burden and applied tariffication in 1999.

The Japanese position in this Round has not changed much from the Uruguay Round, since the country has not changed many of its domestic policies. In 2000, Japan introduced direct payments for farmers in disadvantaged regions. In 2007, it changed the 70 percent of deficiency payments for wheat, barley, sugar and some other dry farming products into green box payments. These policy reforms, however, did not change the domestic prices of agricultural products. Japan therefore has to continue to rely on high tariffs in order to maintain those prices and protect its agricultural sector.

To what extent would a successful conclusion of this Round along the lines of the Revised Draft Modalities paper issued by the chair of the agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Falconer, require changes in Japanese agricultural policies?

How much increased market access is likely to be generated as a result of tariff cuts and tariff rate quota expansion? Could Japan play a more aggressive role in the world market, taking advantage of the expansion of market access generated in other countries?

This paper makes attempts to address these issues by exploring the implications of the Revised Draft Modalities paper.

In addition to quantitative analysis of the extent to which tariffs would be reduced, this paper attempts to analyze the probable and possible effects of the paper on Japanese agriculture and agricultural policies, taking into accounts recent developments in the world market.

The first section of the paper gives an overview of the current state of Japanese agriculture and agricultural policies, insofar as these relate to the disciplines introduced in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). The second section reviews briefly the Japanese positions in this Round. The next three sections discuss in more detail the implications of the domestic support, market access and export competition modalities.

The following section tries to point out several legal drawbacks to the proposed commitments on subsidies, the lack of disciplines on export tax, and the overly lenient disciplines on export quantity restrictions. It also refers to some environmental concerns which are just as important as trade concerns. The final section makes an overall assessment of the impacts of the suggested modalities on Japan.