With the momentum triggered by the EU and US support for an Appendix I listing - which would result in an effective trade ban - in the lead-up to the COP, many observers were stunned to see a vote striking down the ban come so early in the two week conference.

Monaco, which spearheaded the campaign, officially tabled its proposal for an immediate listing of bluefin Appendix I on Thursday. Shortly thereafter, the EU tabled a compromise proposal that would have delayed the implementation of a trade ban until May 2011 to conduct scientific testing to confirm whether bluefin tuna stocks are, in fact, at dangerously low levels.

But rather than opening the proposals up to debate, Libya called for an immediate vote. The Monaco proposal was voted down 20 to 68, with 30 abstentions and the EU proposal fell by 43 to 72 with 14 abstentions. CITES proposals require a two-thirds majority to pass.

Momentum stalled early in talks

Shortly before the start of the COP the EU had surprised many observers by announcing its 27 member states had reached a consensus and would vote for a ban at the Doha, Qatar meeting. Because the EU holds more than 50 percent of the total bluefin catch quota and European countries along the Mediterranean play a major role in the industry, a collective position supporting the ban was seen as unlikely by many observers.

The EU decision built on the momentum of an earlier US announcement that it would also push for an Appendix I listing for the fish. Species listed on Appendix I of CITES are considered to be “threatened with extinction,” and are banned from trade among the 175 countries that are CITES members.

Shortly following the US announcement, Japan - the world’s largest importer of bluefin - went on the offensive, warning that it may not comply with CITES if the treaty blocks the country’s access to the fish. Japan had reportedly managed to muster support for its decision in Doha from China and “several Arab countries” in the early days of the meeting.

Those aligning themselves with Japan said the trade ban would be damaging to poor fishing nations and asserted that the proposal is not backed by sound science. Some 80 percent of the global bluefin tuna catch is exported to Japan, where it is sold as a premium dish in restaurants.

In the wake of the vote, it is unclear where alliances were ultimately placed due to a request from Iceland that countries’ votes be kept secret.

Harsh reaction from green groups

With the bluefin tuna issue - the proposal with top billing in Doha - so quickly defeated, reaction by environmental groups appeared to be one of genuine surprise. Once groups such as WWF and Oceana - which had campaigned strongly in the months leading up to COP - had digested the news, their criticism was harsh.

Dave Allison, senior campaign director of Washington-based Oceana called the vote “a clear win by short-term economic interest over the long-term health of the ocean and the rebuilding of Atlantic bluefin tuna populations and fishery.”

Allison also criticised the procedures followed in Doha, calling the secret voting process an “attack on transparency” and arguing that the timing of the vote stifled debate. “Although there were repeated calls from delegates from the EU, US, and Monaco to allow time for parties to meet and arrive at a compromise position, the Libya delegate forced a preemptory vote.” Allison said in a statement.

Sergi Tudela, head of fisheries at WWF Mediterranean concurred, saying “it is scandalous that governments did not even get the chance to engage in meaningful debate about the international trade ban proposal.”

Back to ICCAT

With the defeat of the bluefin proposal at CITES, management for the fishery remains in the hands of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). However, conservationists have argued for years that the regulatory body is incapable of adequately managing the industry.

ICCAT has attempted to help make the bluefin fishery more sustainable in recent years - most recently reeling in catch quotas from 22,000 tonnes in 2009 to 13,500 tonnes for 2010 and decreasing the purse seiner fishing season by one month - but critics argue that the organisation has not done enough to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

Proponents of the Appendix I CITES listing argued that regulations governing trade would be more effective than attempting to regulate fishing fleets. By ICCAT’s own numbers, more bluefin tuna was exported to Japan alone than the total allowable catch for 2007.

“ICCAT…has repeatedly failed to sustainably manage this fishery,” said WWF’s Tudela. “ICCAT has so far failed miserably in this duty so every
pressure at the highest level must come to bear to ensure it does what it should.”

For its part, Japan says it acknowledges that bluefin tuna stocks are under threat, but it argues that reduced catch limits accompanied by stricter enforcement would be a more sensible way to deal with the problem.

“We will intensify our efforts to control these resources and prevent illegal harvesting of these fish,” Japan’s agriculture minister Hirotaka Akamatsu told reporters Friday. “We believe we have the responsibility to show leadership in control over these resources.”

Environmental groups are now hoping to convince consumers to boycott the fish as an improvised means to help reduce demand. “It is now more important than ever for people to do what the politicians failed to do - stop consuming bluefin tuna,” Tudela said.

Other species under the microscope in Doha

The blufin tuna defeat was the first of two major defeats for conservationists on Tuesday. A US led proposal that would stop international trophy hunting of polar bears was also struck down at the meeting. Polar bear habitat is under threat from climate change, which is rapidly melting sea ice.

“While we are disappointed with the votes today … we are heartened by the support around world to up-list the polar bear and bluefin tuna,” Tom Strickland, assistant secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks told reporters following Thursday’s vote.

Other proposals waiting for a vote at the CITES COP include the addition of eight shark species to Appendix II - where trade is heavily regulated, but not banned - and measures regulating dozens of coral species.

ICTSD Reporting; “Japanese Fish Dealers Welcome Tuna Ban Rejection,” ABC NEWS, 19 March 2010; “U.N. Rejects Export Ban on Atlantic Bluefin Tuna,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 March 2010; “Conference rejects protection for polar bears,” CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 19 March 2010; “Global conference rejects bans on trade in bluefin tuna, polar bear,” THE WASHINGTON POST, 19 March 2010.

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The publishing of the list of 21 proposed intellectual property sanctions follows the announcement last week of the 102 US goods that are set to be hit with retaliatory tariffs as of 7 April. Brazil estimates that its announced tariffs on goods would have a total value of US$591 million, while the IP restrictions would be worth US$238 million.

The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body ruled in 2005 that the US cotton support programme - specifically, its direct subsidies and a loan guarantee scheme - distort the global cotton market and violate world trade rules. A subsequent compliance panel ruling found that reforms that the US had introduced had failed to bring the country’s cotton subsidies in line with its obligations at the WTO.

In a final ruling last year, the global trade body officially authorised Brazil to impose retaliatory sanctions of up US$829 million, including through ‘cross retaliation’ - the imposition of punitive measures in a sector or under an agreement other than the sector or agreement in which the original violation occurred. If Brazil follows through with the measures proposed on Monday, it will become the first WTO member to ‘cross retaliate’ against another country’s intellectual property.

“We want to show the US that it doesn’t matter if you are big or small, or how much money you have as a nation,” Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said on 10 March, according to media reports. “We all want to be respected and to be treated fairly.”

The new retaliatory measures include the suspension - without compensation, and for a fixed period of time - of intellectual property rights on pharmaceuticals; chemicals and biotech products for agricultural use; and copyrights on music, books, and films and other audiovisual products. The measures would also allow Brazil to authorise ‘parallel imports’ - that is, imports of products very similar to patented products - in the pharmaceutical and farm chemicals sectors. The Brazilian government would also be able to impose additional fees for the registration or renewal of patents and copyrights, and to confiscate a portion of the royalties that Brazilian branches of US firms send back to company headquarters.

The Brazilian government is now allowing 20 days of public consultations on the proposed new IP sanctions. A final list of cross retaliation measures will be announced at a later date.

The IP sanctions were not expected to be announced until later this month, but the various ministers involved in the process reportedly decided that there was no need to wait for Brazil’s trade chamber, Camex - which is housed in the Ministry of Industry, Development and Trade (MDIC) - to give its final approval before kicking off the consultation process. Carlos Márcio Cozenday, director of the economic division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denied that the IP sanctions were announced early because officials had failed to negotiate a solution last week during a visit from several high-level US officials, including Commerce Secretary Gary Locke.

Lytha , secretary for international trade at the MDIC, explained in an interview on the television programme “Roda Viva” that, unlike the new tariffs on US goods, the IP measures are expected to lower prices for Brazilian consumers. She acknowledged, however, that there are still concerns in some quarters that the measures could trigger shortages in Brazil, especially in certain medicines that local industry is not able to supply. But Spíndola explained that the authorisation of ‘parallel imports’ of drugs from countries where the drugs’ patents have already expired would offset any potential shortage. She also noted that the government’s aim was to target patents that will soon expire in Brazil so as to spur local industry to adapt quickly to supply the domestic market.

Spíndola reiterated that Brazil would be willing to cancel its retaliatory measures if it could secure a sufficient compensation package from the US, coupled with a commitment from Washington to eliminate its illegal cotton subsidies in the next version of its Farm Bill, the comprehensive legislation that sets the levels and types of support for US farmers. The most recent version of the bill, which is renewed roughly every five years, was passed in 2008.

So far, however, Brazil has yet to receive a concrete offer from the United States, Spíndola said. That being the case, Brazil will continue to push ahead with its retaliatory measures.

A spokeswoman from the Office of the US Trade Representative warned on Tuesday that Brazil’s move to threaten US intellectual property rights could turn investors away from Brazil.

“Some proposals raise concern regarding their potential impact on the investment climate in Brazil,” Nefeterius McPherson said in an emailed statement to Bloomberg. “We will continue to work with Brazil and consult with the US Congress and stakeholders in an effort to reach a solution to the issues in this dispute without Brazil proceeding with countermeasures.”

ICTSD reporting; “Brazil sanctions raise concern on investment climate, USTR says,” BLOOMBERG, 16 March 2010.

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Las negociaciones entre la UE con Perú y Colombia para lograr un tratado de libre comercio (TLC) llegaron a su término el pasado 28 de febrero en Bruselas, Bélgica, y aunque aún no se ha realizado la firma respectiva, se espera que ésta ocurra en el marco de la Cumbre entre la UE y América Latina y el Caribe en mayo de este año en Madrid, España.

Tras la firma las partes procederán a iniciar el trámite respectivo, que tanto en el caso de los países andinos como en el del bloque europeo iniciarán por una valoración legal del texto firmado. Posteriormente, tanto Colombia como Perú deberán someterlo a la aprobación del Congreso de cada país, paso necesario para que los Presidentes ratifiquen los tratados.

Dos años es lo que tardaría la implementación del TLC entre la UE y Perú según el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior y Turismo (Mincetur) del Perú. Mientras que el de Colombia no cuenta con un cronograma estimado todavía pero se prevé que tome más tiempo.

Lo negociado

Dentro de los detalles que se han empezado a conocer del cierre del acuerdo se cuenta para el caso de Colombia que el 99% de sus exportaciones del sector industrial y pesquero hacia la UE tendrán desgravación de aranceles desde la entrada en vigencia del acuerdo.

Para el Perú la desgravación de los aranceles abarcaría el 99,3% de sus exportaciones tras la puesta en ejecución del tratado, de tal manera que el 95% de sus productos agrícolas entren libres de gravámenes, según informó Mincetur.

Se estima por su parte que se observará una liberalización total del 80% de los productos industriales exportables de la UE hacia el Perú, y de un 65% con Colombia apenas entren en vigor los acuerdos. La UE así busca consolidarse como el segundo socio comercial de la región andina después de Estados Unidos.

En Colombia se espera un aumento en volúmenes exportados en sectores como las manufacturas de cuero, textiles y confecciones, plásticos y sus manufacturas y los productos de pesca, donde el 65% de las exportaciones tendrán cero aranceles de forma inmediata. El azúcar, la carne, el banano, el café, las flores, el etanol y el ron embotellado, entre otros productos, tendrán más ventajas al ingresar al mercado europeo. Colombia podrá vender hasta unas 50.000 toneladas de azúcar por año, mientras que el arancel para el banano pasará de 176 euros por tonelada a 75 euros en diez años.

Respecto a compras del sector público, los acuerdos indican que los empresarios de ambas partes podrán tener acceso a todas las instituciones del nivel central, subcentral, empresas y entidades independientes tanto de los países suramericanos como de los estados de la UE. Por su parte, la UE tendrá preferencias en sus exportaciones hacia Colombia en productos procesados de cerdo (jamones), licores, leche en polvo, quesos, automóviles, bienes de capital, intermedios y ciertos insumos, entre otros productos, con plazos de desgravación total similares a los negociados con Estados Unidos.

En materia de indicaciones geográficas, Mincetur ha informado que el Perú concedió a la UE el reconocimiento de una lista que incluye 200 indicaciones geográficas, conformada principalmente por vinos y productos agrícolas, mientras que el bloque europeo hizo lo propio respecto a las cuatro únicas indicaciones geográficas del Perú: Pisco, Maíz Blanco Gigante Cusco, Pallar de Ica y Chulucanas.

En el tema pesquero, de particular interés para el Perú, se logró que cada tres años se revisarán las cuotas asignadas a los productos pesqueros peruanos exportados a la UE. Mincetur informó que en relación a la regla de origen para la pesca, Perú contará con una excepción a la condición de propiedad de las embarcaciones para dar origen a especies en las cuales el país presenta interés de exportación (caballa, jurel, pota, anchoas), tanto en congelado como en conservas.

Esta flexibilidad se da para la captura dentro de las 200 millas desde las líneas de base de Perú y sobre cuotas que podrán ser revisitadas cada tres años desde la entrada en vigencia del TLC.

Por otra parte, tanto Colombia y Perú podrán seguir usando las exenciones de Aranceles Aduaneros (drawback), de forma tal que la UE aceptó por primera vez en un acuerdo comercial que las mercancías que gocen de este mecanismo continuarán siendo consideradas como originarias y se beneficiarán de las preferencias del TLC.

Lo que falta

Tanto para Perú, Colombia y la UE el camino a seguir implicará un prolongado proceso. Posterior a la firma de los acuerdos, que se estima sea en mayo, deberá realizarse una revisión legal y posteriormente el trámite legislativo correspondiente. A todas luces, el acuerdo entre la UE-Perú es el que menos problemas presentaría.

Sin embargo, en el caso colombiano se augura un fuerte debate luego de algunas críticas, principalmente provenientes del sector lechero del país, el cual dará la pelea para mantener ciertos mecanismos que protejan a su sector de las exportaciones europeas subsidiadas.

En declaraciones a medios locales, el presidente de la Federación de ganaderos de Colombia (Fedegan), José Félix Lafaurie, indicó que “es muy difícil que la Unión Europea de marcha a atrás a esta decisión (la del sector lácteo), por los intereses económicos que le representaría. Esperamos que el Gobierno logre eliminar esta parte del acuerdo, porque tal como está no es benéfico para el país”.

En la misma línea representantes del sector agrícola colombiano se han pronunciado expresando su rechazo a las concesiones realizadas en el sector. Para ellos, la competencia será desigual por la fuerte política de subsidios agrícolas que tiene la UE y que evidencia el mayor riesgo del acuerdo alcanzado.

Otro factor, quizás más determinante para el futuro del TLC entre la UE-Colombia, es el tema de los derechos humanos en el país sudamericano. Fuertes llamadas de atención de organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) y sectores de la sociedad europea se han hecho notar tras el cierre de las negociaciones.

Así las cosas, será más probable que el acuerdo entre la UE y el Perú esté listo para 2012, mientras que Colombia deberá contar con un apoyo redoblado en el Parlamento Europeo si no desea que este tratado corra la misma suerte quehan tenido sus TLC firmados con los EE.UU. y Canadá debido a la falta de cumplimiento en materia de derechos humanos, sindicales y laborales.
Reportaje ICTSD y CINPE, fuentes consultadas:

Angustia de lecheros por el TLC con UE (2010, 6 de marzo). Diario El Colombiano. Consultado el 14 de marzo de 2010 en http://www.elcolombiano.com/BancoConocimiento/A/angustia_de_lecheros_por_el_tlc_con_ue/
angustia_de_lecheros_por_el_tlc_con_ue.asp?CodSeccion=186

Cada tres años se revisarán cuotas de productos pesqueros que Perú exporte a la Unión Europea en marco del TLC (2010, 5 de marzo). Agencia Peruana de Noticias Andina. Consultado el 14 de marzo de 2010 en http://www.andina.com.pe/Espanol/Noticia.aspx?id=hjgBYEzYW0I=

En segundo semestre culminaría revisión legal de TLC Perú - Unión Europea, prevé Mincetur (2010, 11 de marzo). Agencia Peruana de Noticias Andina. Consultado el 14 de marzo de 2010 en http://www.andina.com.pe/Espanol/Noticia.aspx?id=Yvsckpbgdgw=

Llegó la hora de los nuevos negocios con Europa (2010, 7 de marzo). El País. Consultado el 14 de marzo de 2010 en http://www.elpais.com.co/paisonline/notas/Marzo072010/1negocios.html

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But despite the “relatively muted” trade and investment policy response to the global recession, the report warned that the threat of increased protectionism remained very real, due to record unemployment levels and the uncertain economic recovery. It noted that “prolonged periods of job losses and unemployment” have driven protectionist measures in the past.

Released to governments and the public on 8 March, the report by officials from the WTO, the OECD, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development monitored the trade and investment policies of members of the Group of 20 leading industrialised and developing nations from September 2009 to mid-February 2010. The first such report, released last fall, examined policies in the year to September 2009.

At summits in Pittsburgh and London last year, G-20 leaders pledged to refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services. The report shows that several G-20 countries did so anyway. The policies ranged from run-of-the-mill tariff increases in some cases to the launching of several anti-dumping investigations (although fewer in 2009 than in 2008). A few governments introduced more restrictive procurement practices, such as ‘buy domestic’ requirements, and non-tariff barriers (some of them rather exotic, such as an Indonesian rule stipulating that only Indonesian citizens based in the country have the right to import and sell alcoholic beverages there). Some 1,489 notifications of non-tariff barriers under the Agreement on Technical Barriers on Trade were notified to the WTO secretariat in 2009, compared to 1,272 in 2008.

However, the report took pains to underline the limited scope of the trade-restricting measures. The WTO secretariat estimates that the import restrictions introduced between September 2009 and mid-February 2010 cover 0.7 percent of total imports by G-20 countries (0.4 percent if fuel was removed from the calculation), compared to 1.3 percent in the year to October 2009. The report emphasised that the resulting reduction in trade was “considerably less,” apart from the case of some prohibitive restrictions. And many of the restrictions focused on minerals, metals, and textile products, sectors that tended to be relatively protected to begin with. The report noted that several governments took steps to increase openness to trade and investment flows.

The report also found no “open discrimination against foreign investors,” and “no major measure” to reduce access to G-20 markets in terms of services trade. However, it pointed to potential discriminatory effects arising from emergency government support to the financial and automobile sectors. “Emergency measures have politicised processes of firm exit and restructuring, and government holdings acquired as part of the crisis response may jeopardise governments’ impartiality in policy making and law enforcement,” it warned.

The previous edition of the report had also concluded that governments had been successful at containing protectionist pressures, but warned that crisis-related measure risked artificially altering market competition and investment decisions, with the threat of “chronic trade distortions.”

The new report outlined a sequence for governments to begin unwinding crisis-related measures, “when it is judged timely to do so.” Protectionist border measures should go first, ideally with multilateral coordination, followed by behind-the-border policies that discriminate between domestic and foreign goods or firms. Then, sector-specific measures should be tackled, particularly those that support capital rather than labour. Specific consumption subsidies should be next, with generic consumption measures like temporary cuts to value-added tax (VAT) rates last to go.

Data: trade recovering, but joblessness casts shadow

In addition to lengthy annexes detailing trade and investment measures taken by each country, along with descriptions of financial sector bailouts and general stimulus measures, the 85-page report provides data on trade volumes, GDP growth, and unemployment for G-20 members.

World merchandise trade is recovering from a 12 percent drop in 2009 that returned trade volumes to levels last seen in 2006, it shows, attributing much of the improvement to China and other East Asian countries. In December, world merchandise trade rose by 4.8 percent over the preceding month.

In the last quarter of 2009, developing countries in Asia, including China, enjoyed fast export and import growth, of 10 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively. Industrialised countries saw imports rise by 3.9 percent, while exports rose by 4.1 percent. But their export performance was variable: US and Japanese exports increased by around 8 to 9 percent, while Europe’s grew by only 2 percent. Africa - which was hit especially hard in 2009 by the drop in prices of the commodities that make up the bulk of its exports - saw both imports and exports decline in the final quarter of the year.

While the report concluded that G-20 governments’ attempts to catalyse more trade finance had met with considerable success, with the cost of trade finance in China, India, and Brazil almost half of what it was a year ago, credit remained hard to come by for small traders, particularly in Africa.

As for investment, foreign direct investment flows fell from US$1.7 trillion in 2008 to US$1 trillion in 2009, although there was a moderate pickup in the second and third quarters of the year.

Despite the positive developments, the WTO, the OECD, and UNCTAD stressed that there were clouds on the horizon. The economic recovery was fragile, and that large-scale unemployment could give rise to protectionist pressures. Some 27 million people around the world lost their jobs in 2009, taking the number of jobless to over 200 million and the global unemployment rate to its “highest level ever.”

They urged G-20 governments to “remain vigilant in opposing protectionism,” to devise exit strategies from crisis-related measures that had potential to distort trade, and to “work diligently and quickly” to conclude the long-struggling Doha Round trade talks. A Doha agreement, they suggested, would “strengthen the multilateral trading system and to improve multilateral market access.”

Levels of concern vary

Despite its warnings about the future, the WTO-OECD-UNCTAD report was fairly relaxed about the extent of protectionism that governments have introduced thus far. This view is shared by some analysts, such as Patrick Messerlin at the Groupe d’Economie Mondiale and the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, who believe that the current level of protectionism is modest, and that excessive warnings about it would weaken economists’ credence in the event of a serious trade war.

Simon Evenett, the director of Global Trade Alert, a service that provides real-time monitoring of protectionist policies along with their likely victims, is considerably less sanguine. He argues that the report’s assessment did not adequately reflect a wide range of government measures, often falling outside the jurisdiction of WTO rules, that served to distort production and trade.

These include subsidies to manufacturing industry and government procurement. The most recent report by the Global Trade Alert, released last month, noted that since September 2009, several major trading nations had taken “taken far-reaching measures that discriminate against foreign commercial interests,” often slipping unnoticed under the media radar screen. China, for example, had introduced a new accreditation procedure for firms wanting to bid for high-tech state contracts, and the US House of Representatives had approved further ‘Buy America’ provisions. Russia, a G-20 country that is not part of the WTO, has introduced a raft of tariff increases and industrial support measures.

According to the Global Trade Alert report, discriminatory measures against foreign commercial interests are above even generously defined historical trends (though below 1930s levels) in every major trading nation except Brazil and Canada.

Evenett, a professor of economics at the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland, told Bridges that while trade remedies such as anti-dumping duties lapse after a certain time period, procurement policies, subsidies, and other industrial policy measures tend not to - unless governments choose to unravel them.

Asked about the report’s estimate that a mere 0.7 percent of G-20 imports stood to be affected by increased protection, he said “They’ve looked at a small number of measures and got a small number. No surprise.”

ICTSD reporting.

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Uma decisão do Órgão de Apelação (OA), em 2009, estipulou em US$ 830 milhões o montante do prejuízo sofrido pelos exportadores brasileiros em decorrência dos programas de apoio estadunidenses. Parte desse valor poderá ser revertida ao Brasil por meio do aumento na alíquota imposta aos produtos contidos na lista.

A fim de evitar prejuízo à cadeia produtiva brasileira, o governo optou por concentrar os produtos sancionados no setor de consumo, excluindo insumos industriais. Dentre os itens contidos na lista, encontram-se cosméticos como cremes, xampus e maquilagens, cuja tarifa duplicou - de 18% para 36%. Para algodão e diversos tecidos deste material, o aumento corresponde a 100%. Apesar de ser pouco significativo o comércio entre os dois países neste setor, a maior elevação da lista possui significado político.

Os produtos agrícolas dos EUA também foram alvo da retaliação. Diversos itens alimentícios sofrerão sobretaxas entre 30% e 48%: carne; frutas como ameixa, cereja e pêra; batata; sucos e polpas de frutas; e soro de leite. Ademais, o governo anunciou que os automóveis poderão receber aumento de 35% para 50%. As sobretaxas entrarão em vigor em 30 dias.

Estima-se que o prejuízo dos exportadores estadunidenses com o aumento das tarifas corresponderá a US$ 560 milhões. Ainda, poderão ser aplicados outros US$ 270 milhões em sanções sobre bens de propriedade intelectual, dentro do procedimento conhecido como retaliação cruzada. Esta modalidade, permitida pelas regras da OMC, constitui o ponto mais delicado para os EUA, um dos grandes detentores de patentes.

O Brasil alterou recentemente sua legislação para possibilitar a aplicação da retaliação cruzada. Por meio da Medida Provisória (MP) No. 482, editada em 11 de fevereiro, o governo estipula procedimentos para retaliar membros da OMC na área de propriedade intelectual. As medidas previstas incluem a suspensão e limitação de direitos nessa matéria, bem como alteração na forma de obtenção ou manutenção destes. A MP contempla também o bloqueio temporário de remessa de royalties ou outro tipo de remuneração por direitos neste setor, ou a constituição de outros direitos de natureza comercial sobre tais remunerações.

Contudo, a aplicação de retaliação cruzada gera polêmica, mesmo entre setores internos brasileiros. Segmentos da indústria mostram-se apreensivos sobre a adoção de tal medida por temerem represálias por parte dos EUA. O ministro das Relações Exteriores, Celso Amorim, confirma o desejo do país em evitar o recurso a esta medida, porém alerta que o governo não deixará de aplicá-la em função de possíveis represálias por parte do parceiro comercial.

A opção pela retaliação na área de propriedade intelectual é vista como uma poderosa arma de barganha para o Brasil. No período entre a publicação da MP e a publicação da lista de produtos, a secretária de Estado dos EUA, Hillary Clinton, visitou o Brasil. Entre os tópicos da pauta, a delegada estadunidense comentou a disposição de seu país em retomar as negociações a fim de evitar a retaliação. Gary Locke, secretário de Comércio dos EUA, deverá chegar ao Brasil hoje para discutir o assunto.

O setor privado brasileiro almeja a eliminação dos subsídios declarados ilegais pelo OA. Parte dos programas condenados pela OMC estão incluídos na Lei Agrícola dos EUA, e portanto, sua alteração depende de um ato legislativo. Especialistas brasileiros defendem que o Executivo dos EUA pode eliminar o efeito do programa GSM por meio da diminuição dos juros. O setor privado brasileiro sugere a adoção de formas de compensação, como a criação de um fundo financiado pelo governo estadunidense para apoiar os produtores brasileiros a investir em tecnologia. Também foi sugerida a eliminação de limitações às exportações brasileiras de carne, suco de laranja e etanol.

Há pouca chance de que o Congresso dos EUA discuta os programas de subsídios em breve, em virtude do excesso de compromissos na agenda para este ano. A votação da próxima Lei Agrícola do país está prevista para 2012.

A lista de produtos divulgada pelo governo brasileiro encontra-se disponível em: http://www.in.gov.br/imprensa/visualiza/index.jsp?data=08/03/2010&jornal=1&pagina=5&totalArquivos=100 .

Reportagem Equipe Pontes

Fontes consultadas:

Diário Oficial da União. Resolução No. 15, de 05 de março de 2010. (08/03/2010). Disponível em: http://www.in.gov.br/imprensa/visualiza/index.jsp?data=08/03/2010&jornal=1&pagina=5&totalArquivos=100 . Acesso em: 08 mar. 2010.

Medida Provisória N. 482, de 10 de fevereiro de 2010. Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Mpv/482.htm . Acesso em: 08 mar. 2010.

Valor Econômico. Lista de retaliação aos EUA se concentra em produtos de luxo. (08/03/2010). Disponível em: http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/noticiario/nacional/selecao_detalhe3.asp?ID_RESENHA=677359 . Acesso em: 08 mar. 2010.

Agência Senado. Secretária de Estado norte-americana chega amanhã para agenda com Lula e ministros. (01/03/2010). Disponível em: http://www.agenciabrasil.gov.br/?q=node/1077 . Acesso em: 08 mar. 2010.

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Ce document traduit en outre un exemple de coopération entre CEDEAO/UEMOA. Il est  le fruit né de la synergie des volontés communes de deux institutions d’éradiquer la pauvreté dans la région ouest Afrique. Adopté par la 33ème commission  de la conférence des Chefs d’Etats et de gouvernement de la CEDEAO en janvier 2008 à Ouagadougou et validé en Octobre 2009, son lancement a été décidé le même mois à Abuja.

La stratégie régionale se veut la réponse adéquate des deux Entités à la demande des gouvernements ouest africains notamment devant l’émergence d’un nombre croissant de problématiques transfrontalières.

C’est pourquoi le DSRRP est défini comme un cadre de stratégie  régional de référence en vue d’une meilleure structuration et d’une meilleure conjugaison des programmes régionaux de réduction de la pauvreté.

L’ECOWAP pour soutenir le développement et lutter contre la pauvreté

Dans la même période, les pays de la sous région adoptent le pacte Ecowap de la Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Cedeao)

Un pacte qui, lui-même, constitue le cadre de référence au niveau régional de la mise en oeuvre du volet agricole du Nepad à travers le Programme détaillé de l’agriculture en Afrique (Pddaa). Ce programme national est articulé autour de six thèmes portant sur l’amélioration de la gestion de l’eau, le développement durable des exploitations agricoles, la gestion améliorée des autres ressources naturelles, le développement des filières agricoles et la promotion des marchés, la prévention et la gestion des crises alimentaires.

Ecowap est un processus qui cherche à aider chacun des pays de la Cedeao à atteindre les objectifs du millénaire pour le développement. Et pour assurer cet effort de financement, les chefs d’Etat africains se sont engagés, dans le cadre du Pdda, à consacrer 10 % de leurs budgets au secteur agricole, avec l’ambition d’atteindre, d’ici 2015, un taux de croissance du secteur de 10 %.

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Backing from the Obama administration to add the fish to Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is the second major announcement in as many weeks. On 22 February the European Commission also recommended that the 27 EU member states offer their support for the ban under the condition that an implementation delay suggested by France be observed.

For years, conservationists have argued that the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the regulatory body responsible for bluefin tuna stocks, is incapable of adequately managing the industry. And the recent move by the US shows that the Obama administration now agrees.

“The regulatory mechanisms that have been relied upon have failed to do the job,” said Tom Strickland, the Interior Department’s assistant secretary for fish and wildlife and parks. “We are literally at a moment where if we don’t get this right, we could see this very, very special species really at risk for survival.”

If CITES member states vote to add bluefin tuna to Appendix I at the organisation’s 13-25 March Conference of the Parties (COP 15), it would effectively ban all international trade in the fish between the 175 CITES member countries. Some 80-90 per cent of the global bluefin tuna catch is exported to Japan, where it sold as a premium dish in restaurants.

EU position still unclear

With more than 50 per cent of the total bluefin catch quota, European countries along the Mediterranean play a major role in the industry. France surprised many by agreeing to support the ban, but Paris’ condition that an 18 month delay in implementation has frustrated environmental groups (see Bridges Trade BioRes, 5 February 2010, http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/69843/).

Most European countries now support the move, with the notable exceptions of maritime countries Greece, Malta, and Spain. But the European Commission ratcheted up pressure on the outstanding member states by recommending that all EU countries back the CITES Appendix I addition.

“The Commission is deeply concerned that overfishing of Atlantic bluefin tuna driven largely by international trade is seriously depleting stocks of the species,” reads a 22 February press release. “The Commission considers, on the basis of the most recent scientific data available, that Atlantic bluefin tuna should be included in Appendix I of CITES.”

But despite the positive momentum provided by the EC position, critics say the Commission’s acceptance of France’s 18 month delay is not in line with their stated concern. “If the EU is serious about respecting scientific advice - as it claims - it should support an immediate closure of the bluefin tuna fishery as well as a ban in the international trade of bluefin tuna instead of imposing conditions and delays,” said Raül Romeva, a European Green MEP.

France says the delay is needed to conduct scientific testing to confirm whether bluefin tuna stocks are at dangerously low levels, but green groups say the measure does not conform to CITES practices and is actually meant to appease local fishing communities with elections on the horizon.

“The best available data of barely four months ago already demonstrates as clear as day that stock levels are under 15 per cent of historical levels,” said Sergi Tudela, head of the WWF Mediterranean’s fisheries programme, referring to analyses published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and ICCAT itself.

In order for the 27 EU member states to come together as a unified voting bloc in Doha, they will first have to meet at a European Council meeting between representatives of all member state governments. Some observers say this could happen as late as 15 March - after the opening COP 15.

US support a “turning point”

The US had offered preliminary support for bringing bluefin tuna to CITES based on their assessment of ICCAT’s adoption of adequate control measures. But despite reeling in catch quotas from 22,000 tonnes in 2009 to 13,500 tonnes for 2010 and decreasing the purse seiner fishing season by one month (see Bridges Trade BioRes, 27 November 2009, http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/62325/), the US has concluded that more needs to be done.

“We recognize that the parties to ICCAT took some unprecedented steps,” Strickland said in a news release. “However, in light of the serious compliance problems that have plagued the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean fishery and the fact that the 2010 quota level adopted by ICCAT is not as low as we believe is needed, the United States continues to have serious concerns about the long-term viability of either the fish or the fishery.”

The move by the Obama administration has drawn sharp criticism from fisheries supporters in the US who say that they are being forced to pay for the illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IIU) fishing practices of other countries.

“Even though our fishermen have operated under the strongest conservation measures in the world, if this CITES listing is approved they will have to pay the price for all the other bad actors’ failure to control harvest levels,” said Olympia Snowe Senator, a Republican senator from Maine, a state with a large fishing industry. “I fail to see the logic in supporting a policy that will penalise our fishermen for their contributions to the long-term sustainability of this critical species.”

Several observers have called Washington’s support for the ban a “turning point” on the road to Doha. However, their vote alone at COP 15 will not be enough to see the proposal adopted.

To be accepted, a proposal requires the backing of two thirds of the 175 CITES member countries.  Some observers have speculated that Japan could try to muster support from smaller countries in exchange for generous foreign aid packages. But supporters say the momentum seen so far should help bring more countries on board.

“If the biggest Atlantic bluefin tuna fishing nation in the world, France, and the EU - whose fishing industry has the highest stakes in this fishery, holding more than 50 per cent of total catch quota - can decide to support a CITES Appendix I listing for the sake of preserving the fishery and the tuna, Europe should be able to convince the rest of the international community to follow,” Tudela said.

Given Tokyo’s signal that it may register a reservation on the ban - which in practical terms means it could engage in trade with any other nation that also files a reservation - some countries may be enticed to become one of the few suppliers of bluefin tuna to the world’s biggest market. But while some North African Mediterranean countries, such as Libya, have been known to flout international consensus on fisheries rules, experts say most will follow Europe’s lead.

In addition to supporting bluefin tuna being added to Appendix I, Washington is also pushing Appendix II listings for six shark species and red and pink coral. Such a designation closely monitors and regulates international trade of a species but does not impose a ban.

More information

The EC press release can be accessed here: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/172&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

The press release from the US Department of the Interior can be accessed here:  http://ictsd.org/downloads/biores/p-r-tuna.pdf

ICTSD Reporting. “U.S. Backs Proposed Trading Ban on Bluefin Tuna,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, 3 March 2010; “U.S. backs international trade ban on Atlantic bluefin tuna,” THE WASHINGTON POST, 4 March 2010; “A Move to Save the Bluefin Tuna,” TIME, 4 March 2010.

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Food security quickly emerged as a central issue at the meeting. Recent volatility in food prices, including major spikes in 2007 and 2008, have triggered riots in some poorer nations and panic-buying in wealthy states. Since the mid-1990s, the number of malnourished people in the world has increased to over one billion, or 15 percent of the world’s inhabitants, highlighting some of the key challenges of this century as the global population continues to rise. (The ministers’ communique from the meeting is available here.)

Also discussed at length were the impacts of climate change on food supply and the ways in which the nations most adversely affected are also those with the smallest ability to cope. Agriculture, while a contributor to climate change, also has an important role to play in the reduction of greenhouse gases through practices such as soil carbon sequestration.

Ministers addressed the need for an integrated approach to enhance food security, including poverty alleviation and economic development, as well as efforts to ensure adequate supply of safe and nutritious food. They recognised the important role of trade in reliably ensuring that food can move from places it can be adequately produced to locations where it is not. For this reason, they emphasised the important role of concluding the Doha Development Agenda - the WTO’s eight-year-old global trade talks - in a comprehensive manner.

One major area of disagreement occurred over the issue of rural projects, which the EU believes are central to an integrated, multi-functional approach to agriculture.  Some states, like Austria, whose agriculture minister Nikolaus Berlakovich co-chaired the meeting, called for enhanced government regulation. But New Zealand’s farm minister, David Carter, the other co-chair, advocated against government regulations and in favour of greater volumes of trade on liberalised markets.

Ministers reached the conclusion that future cooperation with countries outside of the OECD will be crucial in order to deal with the issues discussed. They noted the need for more dialogue with emerging economies, as well as collaboration with institutions and agencies like the G20, the WTO, and the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization.

While last week’s meetings did not produce specific measures or policies to address the issues discussed, members agreed on the importance of monitoring progress in the decade ahead. The member states expect to reconvene at the OECD next no later than the middle of the decade to analyse results.

More information

The chairs’ summary of the meeting is available here.

ICTSD reporting; “OECD farmers look at volatility, innovation,” MONEY CONTROL.COM, 27 February 2010; “Communiqué from the Ministers - Meeting of the Committee for Agriculture at Ministerial Level,” OECD, 26 February 2010; “Summary of the Chairs - Meeting of the Committee for Agriculture at Ministerial Level,” 25-26 February 2010.

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However, the underlying paradigms of AfT, the complexity of the concept, the political and institutional issues involved and the specificity compared to traditional development assistance create challenges for implementation. This article sketches out opportunities and major difficulties for putting AfT into development practice and elaborates on possible implications for more traditional aid for growth.

The added value of AfT for development

AfT adds a valuable perspective to the debates on (assistance to) policies for economic growth. The emphasis on exports brings an indispensable quest for competitiveness and efficiency which conventional industrial, agricultural and other economic policy concepts often do not follow with the same rigour. And by combining trade and economic sector policies, export-oriented assistance and development-friendly trade agreements, AfT creates synergies for exports from developing countries. Moreover, the AfT agenda places a spotlight on the potentials of regional integration to act as a stepping stone for full international integration, while also creating opportunities to access untapped regional markets, especially during international turbulences (i.e. food crisis, financial and economic crisis). The European AfT agenda has adopted a particularly strong regional dimension against the background of the regionally-negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).

In times of global economic crisis, when protectionism is lurking around every corner, threatening especially weaker trade partners, a comprehensive AfT agenda is particularly valuable. It can raise attention to the dangers of protectionism for developing countries, and provide ready-made entry points for assisting them in maintaining their export capacities, such as through defending market access and overcoming shortages of trade finance.

Challenges of implementing the AfT agenda

Probably the biggest deception for developing countries has been the decision to account additional AfT as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Many developing countries had seen AfT as a compensation for losses occurring when opening up trade (which they regard as particularly favourable to developed countries). Hence, they had interpreted the “additionality” of AfT as additional to existing donor commitments (in particular to the politically declared - but legally non-binding - target to devote 0.7% of their GDP to ODA).

Similarly, initial uncertainties and manifold changes in the accounting rules of donor countries led to doubts about the additionality of AfT. In fact, overall AfT flows have increased by more than 10% per year since 2005, amounting to more than US$ 25 billion in 2007. In several cases, however, donors have achieved their pledges simply by applying the modified WTO-OECD monitoring rules, without initiating any new projects. This creates the impression that the AfT agenda has resulted in a re-labelling exercise by donors, rather than in genuine fresh aid.

For trade and AfT to be effective, they must be comprehensively and firmly incorporated into the growth and poverty alleviation strategies of developing countries, as well as into relevant sector-specific programmes. In addition, recipient countries must have the capacity to organise the contributions of donors around their national policies. Yet these conditions are often not fulfilled, particularly in poorer countries. Three interlinked factors challenge the formulation and implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda in AfT and in aid to economic sectors more generally: i) the cross-sector complexity of the measures to be taken, ii) the leading role of the private sector with often conflicting interests, and iii) the often limited degree of government dominance in the planning and implementation of productive sectors policies.

Even if comprehensive national programmes exist, no single donor can cater to all of the AfT needs of partner countries (not to mention regions) alone. This must be achieved by a number of donors acting in a coherent way with a high degree of coordination. Traditionally, economic sectors are coordinated (at best) in separate sector-specific donor coordination groups, such as transport, private sector development, and agriculture. Better harmonisation and coordination among these is required to fulfil the AfT agenda.

These problems have led to a certain deception and reduced credibility of the AfT agenda as well as to obstacles and delays in implementation. To renew the impetus, developing countries and donors alike need to re-think and foster their aid for growth by systematically incorporating aspects related to trade and, hence, the ever-increasing interconnectivity of the world economy.

The Case of German Aid for Trade

Germany is a major provider of AfT compared with other donors, ranking third behind Japan and the US and first among EU member states between 2001 and 2006. In 2007, German AfT amounted to approximately €1.2 billion.

Trade-related Assistance (TRA) makes up about 20% of total German AfT (1% trade policy and regulation, 19% trade development). Building productive capacities constitutes 45%, trade-related infrastructure another 35%. With an average TRA of €210 million between 2005 and 2007, Germany has more or less reached its basic self-defined goal of €220 million TRA as a contribution to the EU pledge.[2] However, the level of engagement in TRA fluctuated considerably during that period.[3] This lack of stability can partly be explained by a change in reporting practices applied by one German organisation (DEG). Partly it is also due to the fact that TRA has rather occurred as a by-product of general development programming without being systematically taken into consideration.

The regional focus of German AfT and TRA lies in Asia. German AfT for sub-Saharan Africa appears low (AfT: 16%; TRA: 19%), particularly when compared with the share of this region in overall German ODA (30%).

When looking behind these numbers and into a sample of policy documents, it appears that German development cooperation has regularly taken up trade issues in its private sector and agricultural development programmes. However, this is generally done without a consistent strategic approach with regard to transforming access to regional and international markets into real business opportunities.

Positive features of German AfT in case studies were said to be proximity to local institutions, long-term engagement, technical expertise, a wide array of instruments, and trust. On the negative side, the different aspects of trade-related needs are too rarely tackled through comprehensive German programmes in which the different instruments and implementation agencies are combined. Policy advice is not generally considered the strength of the German development partners. Regional linkages are judged to be weak. Finally, poverty issues are not sufficiently conceptualised and tracked in impact monitoring.

There are valid arguments that donors in general and the EU in particular should strengthen their support for AfT. Especially in the context of EPAs, more European AfT will become necessary. Compared to other EU donors, Germany has good reasons to take over a disproportionally large engagement: German aid has a wealth of AfT-relevant priority areas, instruments, agencies, experiences and a reputation for implementing AfT. As an important sign of its political will to stabilise and mainstream AfT, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has introduced an internal target line (”Zielgröße“) of €140 million per year for TRA. However, what is not yet visible is a close coordination of German AfT within the EU framework.

Conclusions

The comprehensiveness of the AfT agenda, the institutional link to the WTO and the self-interest of donor countries to fulfil the AfT promises in this context could lead to a boost of support to economic topics in development assistance. Indeed, the increased attention to trade and economic sectors in partner countries’ national strategies and in development assistance can be partially attributed to the AfT agenda.

AfT fosters and cements an outward economic orientation of developing countries for both exports and - in the longer run - imports. By increasing the utility of trade opportunities, it enhances their integration into the world market. This is widely accepted as the main path towards development, based on economic theory and practical lessons from successful emerging economies. At the same time, integrating developing countries into global markets is in the more “selfish” interest of the Western world as (future) trading partners and as drivers of the global trade policy agenda. Drawing a clear line between the two motivations is impossible and makes AfT prone to misuse.

Another risk of AfT is that it tends to underestimate the potential of domestic markets. For instance, the rapidly growing population and urbanisation in many African countries creates great opportunities for domestic farmers and food industries.

The AfT agenda also adds to the increasing number of “vertical” initiatives, such as the fund for HIV/AIDS or infrastructure. This leads to a segmentation of development cooperation, while efforts instead should seek to make aid more flexible by aligning it to developing countries’ priorities without earmarking it in advance for certain thematic issues.

For all these reasons, a very careful, transparent and participatory use of the AfT initiative is indispensable. However, trade and AfT are not ends in themselves, but means to achieve the ultimate goal of reducing poverty. Hence, AfT must be embedded in overarching national growth and poverty strategies which balance inward and outward orientation of national economies and ultimately aim to generate resources for social development and poverty reduction.

Authors: Dr. Michael Brüntrup is a senior researcher at the German Development Institute (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE), Department for Competitiveness and Social Development. Petra Voionmaa, a Ph.D. student at the University of Helsinki, worked as a researcher for the DIE until June 2009.

[1] This article is based on findings from a research project commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The whole report (”German Aid for Trade, past experience, lessons learnt, and the way forward, Bonn: DIE studies 52″) can be downloaded under http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ANES-7ZLE3W?Open&nav=expand:Publikationen;active:PublikationenANES-7ZLE3W.

[2] Germany assumes that its basic contribution to the EU’s commitment to increase its TRA to € 2 billion per year by 2010 should equal its share in the EU budget and in the 9th European Development Fund (both approx. 22%), resulting in a provisional target of €220 million per year from 2010 onwards.

[3] TRA increased from €163 million in 2005 to €243 million in 2006 before again falling to €224 million in 2007.