Tariff Reduction, Special Products and Special Safeguards: An Analysis of the Agricultural Tariff Structures of G-33 Countries
by Mario Jales
Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development Series • Issue Paper 2
The concepts of Special Products (SP) and a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) have emerged as a key compromise between the objective of substantial improvement in market access and the principle of special and differential treatment in the Doha Round of negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, approved by the WTO General Council on 1st August 2004, required each member – other than least-developed countries (LDCs) – to make tariff reduction commitments, but also recognized the need to confer developing countries with some flexibility in order to take into account their rural development, food security and livelihood security needs. The present study analyzes the tariff structures of the members of the Group of 33 (G-33) and evaluates the distinct levels of reform effort that countries will have to undertake in the market access pillar of the current round of multilateral negotiations.
The G-33 was initially formed at the eve of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancún, on 9 September 2004, by 23 developing countries that constituted an Alliance for Strategic Products and a Special Safeguard Mechanism. Currently, the group has 42 members straddling Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite the fact that all members are developing countries, the group is very diverse: it brings together some of the world’s largest (China) and smallest (Grenada) agricultural producers, as well as some of the developing world’s most advanced (Korea) and deprived (Haiti) economies. The uniting force behind the group resides in their strong support of SPs and the SSM. The coalition does not have the ambition to reproduce itself in other areas of the negotiations. In fact, some countries that are allies in the context of the G-33 are stark opponents in other areas of the negotiations on agriculture.
This paper is divided in four parts in addition to the introduction. Part II provides an overview of the agricultural tariff schedules prevailing among G-33 countries. It investigates Uruguay Round (1986-1994) tariff-binding and reduction modalities and presents a statistical description of the tariff structures that resulted from them. Due account is also given to the tariff schedules of G-33 countries that have acceded to the WTO after 1995.
Part III contrasts final bound tariff commitments with the tariff levels that are actually applied by G-33 countries. It determines the depth of tariff overhang, classifies countries according to the actual tariff reduction efforts that they will have to make, and identifies tariff peaks that could eventually benefit from the SP designation.
Part IV investigates the concept of import surges and their incidence among G-33 countries. It examines the Jamaican experience for a select group of commodities in the 1985-2003 period, and lists specific cases in other G-33 countries.
Finally, Part V reviews the ongoing negotiations in the Special Session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture and concludes with some remarks on the distinct impacts that market access reform might have in different members of the G-33. The paper should not be interpreted as supportive of the G-33 positions in the Doha Round. Its objective is not to advance the agenda of a particular group of countries, but rather to investigate the potential effects that tariff reduction commitments will have in the tariff structures of WTO members.